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TRANSNATIONAL LAW, DOMESTIC COURTS,
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
By Christopher A. Whytock*
[DRAFT: March 15, 2007, Revised]
Domestic courts are global governors. In the United States federal courts alone,
thousands of disputes arising out of transnational activity are heard each year.1 Substantively,
the decisions of courts in these cases allocate resources among transnational actors.
Jurisdictionally, they allocate governance authority among states by determining whether a
domestic or foreign court should adjudicate a dispute, whether domestic or foreign law should be
applied to govern the underlying transnational activity, and whether the decisions of foreign
courts in transnational disputes should be given domestic effect. Moreover, when domestic
courts publish their transnational litigation decisions, they not only directly affect the litigants;
they also provide information about how they are likely to decide similar cases in the future,
information that can indirectly influence the strategic behavior of transnational actors beyond a
particular dispute.
Yet the governance of transnational activity by domestic courts—which I refer to as
“transnational judicial governance”2—has received little scholarly attention,3 even though legal
scholars and political scientists have long appreciated the role of domestic courts in the
governance of domestic activity,4 and are increasingly interested in the role of international
courts in the governance of both domestic and international activity.5 As a result, we have a very
1

Between 1995 and 2005, an average of 3,285 cases per year based on diversity jurisdiction and involving at least
one non-U.S. party were terminated in U.S. district courts, according to data obtained from the Federal Judicial
Center. Diversity of citizenship is only one basis for U.S. federal court jurisdiction over transnational disputes. This
figure therefore excludes transnational disputes that are brought in federal courts based on jurisdictional grounds
other than diversity, such as federal question jurisdiction. It also excludes transnational suits that do not involve a
non-U.S. party (but involve activity with connections to more than one state), that are brought in U.S. state courts, or
that are brought in non-U.S. courts. Therefore, this figure only offers an estimate of the minimum number of
transnational disputes in domestic courts each year.
2
Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial Governance: The Case of Forum
Non Conveniens (Feb. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=969033) [hereinafter
Whytock, Transnational Judicial Governance]; Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance
(Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923907 [hereinafter Whytock, Domestic
Courts and Global Governance].
3
Cf. Samuel P. Baumgartner, “Is Transnational Litigation Different?” 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1297, 1302 (2004)
(noting that the foundations of transnational litigation “have largely remained untouched by systematic
scholarship”).
4
See, e.g., Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court as National PolicyMaker, 6 J. of Pub. L. 279 (1957); Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism (2004); Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (1981); Alec Stone Sweet,
Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (2000); and Neal C. Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder, The
Global Expansion of Judicial Power (1995).
5
See, e.g., Karen Alter, Private Litigants and the New International Courts, 39 Comp. Pol. Stud. 22 (2006); Rachel
A. Cichowski, Courts, Democracy, and Governance, 39 Comp. Pol. Stud. 3 (2006); Laurence R. Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273 (1997); Erik Voeten,
Judicial Behavior on International Courts: The European Court of Human Rights (2006) (unpublished manuscript,
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Whytock 2
limited understanding of how domestic courts behave as global governors, and why they govern
the way they do.
In this paper, I propose a governance-oriented approach for analyzing transnational law
aimed at improving our understanding of transnational judicial governance. In Part I, I clarify
the concept of transnational judicial governance by exploring the global governance implications
of judicial decisionmaking in transnational litigation, and I attempt to demonstrate the
importance of transnational judicial governance as a distinct object of study. Part II describes the
governance-oriented approach, including its focus on transnational law in action and on the
broad implications of domestic court decisionmaking for transnational activity, and noting its
affinities with legal realism and the New Haven school of international law. Part III illustrates
the governance-oriented approach by applying it to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, using
an original dataset of over 200 forum non conveniens decisions made by U.S. district court
judges to evaluate this example of transnational judicial governance according to the rule-of-law
values of predictability and impartiality. Part IV concludes by using Part III’s findings to
evaluate the extent to which domestic courts can effectively foster transnational rule of law.
I. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE
How do states regulate transnational activity? International law and international
relations scholars have emphasized the role of international institutions as tools of global
governance, giving rise to a rich literature on the origins and consequences of international rules
and international organizations.6 However, this preoccupation with international institutions
obscures the fact that domestic institutions also play a central role in state regulation of
transnational activity.7 For example, states often address transnational problems through
transgovernmental networks, which involve direct cross-border interactions among national
regulatory agencies.8 In addition, international political economists have shown that domestic
executive and legislative institutions can be key players in “two-level games,” in which solutions
to international cooperation problems must be negotiated not only among states, but also among
domestic political actors within each state.9 The concept of transnational judicial governance,
which I define as the regulation of transnational activity by domestic courts, draws attention to
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=705363); and Mary L. Volcansek & John F. Stack, Jr., eds., Courts Crossing
Borders: Blurring the Lines of Sovereignty (2005).
6
For overviews of this expansive body of literature, see Martin and Simmons (1998) and Keohane and Martin
(2003), and Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in
Handbook of International Relations 538 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds, 2002). Recent
contributions by international relations scholars include Gruber (2000), Ikenberry (2001), Koremenos, Lipson and
Snidal (2001), Simmons (2000), Simmons and Hopkins (2005) and Von Stein (2005). Recent contributions by
international legal scholars include Norman and Trachtman (2005), Goldsmith and Posner (2005) and Raustiala
(2005).
7
It also obscures the fact that private authority plays an important role in global governance, as well understood by a
growing number of international relations and private international law scholars. See, e.g. [Büthe 2004; Coen and
Thatcher 2005; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Mattli and Büthe 2003, 2005] (international relations); and Paul Schiff
Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (2002) and Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-ment of
Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 Wayne Law Review
1209 (2005) (private international law).
8
(Keohane and Nye 1974; Raustiala 2002; Slaughter 2004; Slaughter and Zaring 2006; Whytock 2005)
9
(Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993; Frieden and Martin 2002, 120-126; Putnam 1988)
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Whytock 3
the role that domestic legal institutions—including domestic courts and domestic law—play in
state regulation of transnational activity.10 To clarify the concept, this part of the paper explains
the allocative functions of transnational judicial governance; its direct and indirect implications
for transnational activity; its highly decentralized structure; and its relationship to the related
concepts of transgovernmental networks and the legalization of world politics.
Transnational Judicial Governance and the Authoritative Allocation of Values
According to David Easton’s classic definition, the study of politics is concerned with
“the authoritative allocation of values”11—that is, with “authoritative social decisions about how
goods, both spiritual and material, are to be distributed.”12 In this sense, transnational judicial
governance is intrinsically political. To illustrate the types of values that are allocated
transnationally by domestic courts, and the nature of the transnational actors among whom these
values are allocated, I will briefly discuss four settings in which transnational judicial
governance decisionmaking takes place in U.S. federal courts: transnational public law litigation,
transnational regulatory litigation, transnational private law litigation, and private international
law decisionmaking.
Transnational public law litigation is litigation in which “[p]rivate individuals,
government officials, and nations sue one another directly, and are sued directly, in a variety of
judicial fora, most prominently domestic courts,” based on rights derived from both domestic
and international law.13 In the United States, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),14 as interpreted

10

The concept thus builds on prior work that has acknowledged the status of domestic courts as global actors. See,
e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 251, 253 (2006) (noting “the
development of national courts as actors within the international community”); Richard A. Falk, The Role of
Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (1964); Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders?
Extraterritoriality as a Mechanism for Global Governance (Mar. 2006) (unpublished paper presented at the annual
meeting of the International Studies Association); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order chap. 2 (2004)
(describing transgovernmental networks of judges); Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, supra note
_; and Christopher A. Whytock, Foreign Law, Domestic Courts, and World Politics (Mar. 2006) (unpublished paper
presented at the annual conference of the International Studies Association). It also builds on earlier conceptual
efforts aimed at consolidating diverse sources of law having implications for transnational activity, beginning with
Philip Jessup’s famous Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School in 1956. Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (1956).
11
David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science 129 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter
Easton, Political System].
12
Easton, Political System, supra note _, at 135. As Easton explains further, the focus is on how “certain things are
denied to some people and made accessible to others,” id. at 130, and on authoritative “modes for allocating
desirable or undesirable things,” id. at 132, and on “how [these] authoritative decisions are made and executed for a
society.” David Easton, An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, 9 World Politics 383, 383 (1957). This
understanding of transnational judicial governance resonates with the New Haven school’s understanding of
international law as a global “process of authoritative decision.” Myres S. McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical
Concepts about International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry, 4 J. of Conflict Resolution 337, 350
(1960).
13
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L. J. 2347, 2348-2349 (1991). As AnneMarie Slaughter and David Bosco note, “[i]ncreasing numbers of individuals, including torture and terrorism
victims, Holocaust survivors, and denizens of the dwindling Amazon rain forest, are now using lawsuits to defend
their rights under international law [in U.S. courts]. The defendants in these cases include multinational
corporations, foreign government officials, and even foreign states themselves.” Anne-Marie Slaughter & David
Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 102.
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by the Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,15 provides the
legal foundation for most transnational public law litigation. In that case, two Paraguayan
citizens sued a Paraguayan official in U.S. federal court for the politically-motivated killing of a
member of their family.16 However, private actors may also be subject to liability under ATCA
for sufficiently “state-like or state-related activities.”17 Thus, transnational public law litigation
has been an increasingly important strategy for human rights protection. When these cases result
in the award of compensatory or punitive damages, domestic courts are allocating economic
resources among state and nonstate actors.18 More fundamentally, these decisions implicate
basic values of safety and human dignity.19
Transnational regulatory litigation is litigation in which U.S. courts apply U.S.
regulatory norms to transnational activity.20 For example, domestic courts frequently apply U.S.
antitrust law to regulate global cartels and other anticompetitive transnational activity, and U.S.
securities laws to regulate cross-border securities fraud.21 Underlying these regulations are
national policies that authoritatively allocate values among consumers, investors, businesses, and
other economic actors; and when U.S. policies allocate these values differently than other states
affected by transnational activity, the extraterritorial application of U.S. law to that activity is
often controversial.22 These values cover a wide variety of policy concerns, including consumer
and investor protection, promotion of competitive markets, and provision of capital—which
inform antitrust and securities regulation—as well as values such as environmental protection,
product safety, public health, and worker safety. More broadly, as Hannah Buxbaum argues,

14

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (providing that federal district courts have jurisdiction over any civil action brought by an alien
for a tort committed in violation of international law).
15
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
16
Id.
17
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Internationalization of Domestic Law, in The Alien Tort Claims Act: An Analytical
Anthology 3, 9 (Ralph G. Steinhardt and Anthony D’Amato eds., 1999).
18
However, plaintiffs that are successful in transnational public law litigation against states or state officials rarely
are able to fully collect compensation. See Koh, supra note _, at 2368 (noting that “no Filartiga-type plaintiff has
apparently collected full compensation for his injuries”).
19
These are among the values identified by Myres McDougal as being allocated by the authoritative decisionmaking
that constitutes international law. McDougal, supra note _, at 343, 349.
20
Hannah Buxbaum coined the term, and is the leading analyst of this type of transnational litigation. Buxbaum
defines transnational regulatory litigation as litigation in domestic courts involving the application of domestic
regulatory norms that are shared by the international regulatory community to transnational activity, in a manner that
provides global regulatory benefits. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 Va. J. Int’l L.
251, 268 (2006) For my descriptive purposes, I adopt a broader definition of transnational regulatory jurisdiction,
dropping the requirement the domestic regulatory rules that are applied necessarily are shared by the regulatory
community or have a beneficial effect on transnational activity. I treat the extent to which these rules are in fact
shared and the extent to which they yield global regulatory benefits as open questions to be answered using
empirical and normative analysis.
21
See Buxbaum, supra note _, at 271-278 (antitrust and securities law) and George A. Bermann, Transnational
Litigation 237-247 (2003) (antitrust, securities, and maritime law).
22
See Bermann, supra note _, at 240 (noting that “[i]n countless antitrust cases, federal courts have applied the
relevant federal statutes to regulate genuinely multinational scenarios, because of substantial effects in the US, thus
arousing objections by foreign parties and foreign governments alike . . .”) and Buxbaum, supra note _, at 268-270
(noting that “the extraterritorial application of domestic law creates substantial conflict between nations” when there
are “differences in substance between the law applied and the law of the other country or countries involved . . .”).
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these cases not only close gaps in international regulation, but also “give domestic courts a role
in the transnational process of articulating and defending global norms.”23
Transnational Private Litigation. Just as international relations scholars’ preoccupation
with international institutions has obscured the role of domestic institutions in global
governance, an emphasis on public law, including human rights law as well as explicitly
regulatory bodies of law such as antitrust and securities law, runs the risk of obscuring the
important role of domestic private law in global governance. According to the widely criticized
but widely used public-private law distinction, private law includes the law of torts, contracts,
and property. But, as Martin Shapiro argues, private law is just as much an instrument of
authoritative value allocation as “public” or “regulatory” law.24 Indeed, “[t]he ‘private’ law of
property and contract authoritatively allocates most of the values in a capitalist society.”25
Moreover, transnational litigation involving private law matters—which Robert Wai refers to as
“transnational private litigation”26—is more common than transnational public law litigation and
transnational regulatory litigation. Therefore, from the perspective of transnational judicial
governance, transnational private litigation is at least as important as other types of transnational
litigation.
The policies underlying private law include compensation for harm, as well as social
regulation through provision of public goods, correction of market failures, and deterrence of
undesirable activity.27 Thus, transnational private litigation can serve both distributive and
regulatory functions.28 Disputes over property rights—including intellectual property rights—
explicitly involve conflicting claims over economic resources. In such disputes, domestic courts
allocate those resources by assigning property rights to one party or another.29 Transnational
actors enter contracts to reduce their uncertainty about how they will share the costs and benefits
of their economic transactions. In contract disputes, domestic courts allocate these costs and
benefits by determining how the contract is interpreted and whether it is enforced.30 In addition,
transnational economic activity may generate externalities; that is, it may have effects on an
actor who does not have a contractual relationship with the person engaged in that activity. In
23

Buxbaum, supra note _, at 254.
Martin Shapiro, From Public Law to Public Policy, or the “Public” in “Public Law,” 5 PS: Political Science and
Politics 410, 413 (1972) (noting, for example, the law of torts, as well as “credit-debtor, landlord-tenant, sellerpurchaser and a host of other areas of [private] law that set the balance of economic power between competing
segments of society”).
25
Martin Shapiro, Public Law and Judicial Politics, in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II 365, 366 (Ada
W. Finifter ed., 1993).
26
Robert Wai, Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational Governance, in Criticizing Global Governance
243-261 (Markus Lederer & Philipp S. Müller eds., 2005) [hereinafter Wai, Transnational Private Litigation].
27
Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J.
471, 474 (2005).
28
Wai, Transnational Private Litigation, supra note _, at 245.
29
For discussions of the economics of property law, see e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics
chaps. 4-5 (3d ed. 2000), and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law 14-29 (Feb. 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, available as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 6960, at
http://www.nber.org/papres/w6960).
30
See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 Wis. Int’l L.J. 149, 153 (1988) (noting that
“[t]he [l]egal realists showed that the rules of classical contract law represent the exercise of public power as much
as the rules of antitrust law”). For more general discussions of the economics of tort law, see, e.g., Cooter & Ulen,
supra note _, at chaps. 6-7, and Kaplow & Shavell, supra note _, at 29-45.
24

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=976274

Whytock 6
tort disputes, domestic courts allocate the costs of negative externalities among transnational
actors by determining the extent to which the party generating the externalities must compensate
the party that bears the associated costs.31 Finally, at the intersection of transnational public and
transnational private litigation are disputes involving the economic activity of sovereign states,
including disputes over sovereign debt32 and, more generally, transnational litigation in which a
foreign sovereign does not enjoy immunity from suit in U.S. courts under the commercial
activity exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.33
Private International Law Decisionmaking and the Allocation of Governance Authority.
First and prior to all other questions about governance, says Miles Kahler, is “Who governs?”34
Three basic types of governance authority are at stake: adjudicative authority, which is the
authority of a state to use its courts to resolve disputes involving particular actors or things;
prescriptive authority, which is the authority of a state to apply its law to particular actors or
activities; and enforcement authority, which is the authority of a state to induce or compel
compliance with its law.35 In the governance of transnational activity, however, the answer to
the “who governs” question rarely is obvious. Because such activity has connections to more
than one state, more than one state may have a basis for legitimately exercising the authority to
govern it. The challenge is that “law has become the prerogative of territorial sovereigns,
whereas human affairs freely cross . . . national boundaries.”36
In transnational litigation, domestic courts are routinely called upon to answer the “who
governs” question and to decide how the three types of governance authority should be allocated
among sovereign states.37 These decisions correspond to the three main branches of private
international law: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.38 Yet they share a common domestic-foreign dimension of variation: each decision is
31

See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note _, at 413-414 (noting that tort law “is anxious to define justice between man and
man almost exclusively in terms of what treatment of individual litigants will best achieve preferred social goals”).
For more general discussions of the economics of tort law, see, e.g., Cooter & Ulen, supra note _, at chaps. 8-9, and
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note _, at 2-13.
32
See, e.g., G. Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 57 Duke L. J.
_ (2007).
33
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611.
34
Miles Kahler, Global Governance Redefined 3 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://irpshome.ucsd.edu/faculty/mkahler/GlobGov_10.04.doc). See also Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer,
Who Governs? in Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy 287 (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer
eds., 2001) and Daniel W. Drezner, Who Rules? The Regulation of Globalization (2005) (unpublished book
manuscript available at http://www.danieldrezner.com/research.html).
35
Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble, International Law 699-702 (1991);
36
Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice 3 (special ed. 2005). See also John Gerard Ruggie,
Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 Int’l Org. 139, 164 (1993)
(explaining what he calls the “paradox of absolute individuation” raised by the territorial approach to sovereignty:
“Having established territorially fixed state formations, having insisted that these territorial domains were disjoint
and mutually exclusive, and having accepted these conditions as the constitutive bases of international society, what
means were left to the new territorial rulers for dealing with problems of society that could not be reduced to
territorial solution?”).
37
In addition, these decisions involve the allocation of governance authority among state and nonstate actors. See
discussion below, infra at notes _-_.
38
Juenger, supra note _, at 3; Eugene F. Scoles, Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers & Symeon C. Symeonides, Conflict
of Laws _ (4th ed. 2004).
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either an assertion of domestic authority to govern the underlying transnational activity, or
deference to a foreign state’s authority to govern that activity.39 For example, imagine a dispute
arising out of activity with connections to both State A and State B. If the plaintiff brings the
dispute before a State A court, should the State A court adjudicate the dispute (assertion of
domestic adjudicative authority) or should it dismiss the case so it can be adjudicated by a State
B court (deference to foreign adjudicative authority)? If a State A court decides to adjudicate the
dispute, should it apply State A law to the underlying transnational activity (assertion of
domestic prescriptive authority) or should it apply State B law (deference to foreign prescriptive
authority)? And if a State B court adjudicates the dispute, one party may ask a State A court to
enforce the State B court’s judgment against the other party in State A. Should the State A court
refuse to do so (thus asserting the territorial exclusivity of domestic enforcement authority) or
should it give domestic effect to the foreign judgment (thus deferring to foreign enforcement
authority)?40
By deciding between the assertion of domestic governance authority and deference to
foreign governance authority over transnational activity, domestic courts help define the
domestic reach of foreign authority and the foreign reach of domestic authority. Or, to use
international relations scholar Stephen Krasner’s terminology, they help define the circumstances
39

To clarify, by “deference” I mean, at a minimum, a decision by a State A court not to assert State A’s governance
authority, coupled with an affirmation that, under the circumstances, it is appropriate for State B to exercise its
authority. Thus, deference implies an understanding by State A that authority should be allocated to State B. The
term does not, however, imply that State B is necessarily interested in exercising that authority. For example, a
State A court may defer to State B’s adjudicative authority by declining to exercise its own adjudicative authority
over a lawsuit originally brought in the State A court and dismissing it in favor of a State B court; but State B may
or may not actually exercise its authority. On the other hand, declining to assert domestic authority without a
corresponding affirmation of a foreign state’s authority is mere abstention, not deference, and does not imply an
understanding of the appropriate allocation of governance authority. Deference also may be more active. For
example, a State A court may defer to State B’s prescriptive authority by applying State B’s law to transnational
activity, and a State A court may defer to State B’s enforcement authority by ordering the enforcement within State
A territory of a judgment of a State B court.
40
Situating decisions regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments on the domestic-foreign
dimension is more complicated. If a foreign court issues a judgment, it has exercised its own authority to resolve a
dispute. In transnational disputes, the problem is that “a judgment will operate in foreign states only if the courts of
those states are willing to provide assistance by recognizing or enforcing the judgment: ‘[a]s an act of government [a
judgment’s] effects are limited to the territory of the sovereign whose court rendered the judgment, unless some
other state is bound by treaty to give the judgment effect in its territory, or unless some other state is willing, for
reasons of its own, to give the judgment effect” Born (1996, 936). Thus, by refusing to recognize or enforce a
foreign judgment, a domestic court is, in effect, asserting the exclusivity of its state’s sovereign authority within its
territory. Moreover, such refusal typically is based on a determination by the domestic court that the foreign court
did not have proper jurisdiction over the dispute, that the defendant did not enjoy certain minimum standards of
fairness in the foreign court, or that there the foreign court’s judgment is in some other way defective (see Born
1996, 963 et seq.)—in other words, the refusal is based on a displacement of the foreign court’s authority with the
domestic court’s own authority to determine the proper dispute resolution process or outcome. Therefore, I
conceive of a domestic court decision refusing the recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment as an assertion
of domestic governance authority. In contrast, when a domestic court recognizes or enforces a foreign court’s
judgment, it is deferring to foreign governance authority—namely, the authority of the foreign state to conclusively
resolve a transnational dispute in its own courts according to its own rules and procedures. It is true that in the case
of enforcement, this form of deference depends on a concurrent assertion of domestic enforcement authority in order
to give the foreign judgment domestic effect. Nevertheless, the domestic authority is being exercised in support of
the foreign judgment. For that reason, I conceive of both recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment as
deference to foreign authority.
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in which Westphalian sovereignty is compromised “through invitation.”41 As Michael Reisman
puts it, lawyers may “refer to these encounters as ‘conflicts of laws,’ but they are, in the most
profound sense, conflicts of power, for they engage the very essence of state sovereignty: a
state’s exercise of its political power by making and applying its law.”42 An important part of
transnational judicial governance is the role of domestic courts in resolving (and sometimes
aggravating) these conflicts.
Direct and Indirect Implications
Transnational judicial governance has direct and indirect implications for transnational
activity. For the parties to a particular transnational dispute, the consequences of the allocative
decisions just discussed are direct. These direct effects are the focus of litigant-oriented
approaches to the study of litigation. Without discounting the importance of litigation outcomes
for individual litigants and the study of litigation, the concept of transnational judicial
governance is intended to draw attention to the broader implications of domestic law and
domestic court decisionmaking for transnational activity. Scholars of domestic litigation have
demonstrated the influence that court decisions can have on strategic behavior, which is
expressed in the concept of the “shadow of the law.” Judicial decisionmaking in transnational
litigation casts a transnational shadow, indirectly influencing the behavior of transnational actors
beyond a particular dispute. Another way that domestic legal institutions indirectly affect
transnational activity is by reinforcing, and sometimes undermining, other forms of governance,
including international and private governance.
The Transnational Shadow of Domestic Law. Research on domestic litigation
demonstrates that domestic actors bargain “in the shadow of the law.”43 That is, actors’
expectations about how a court would resolve actual or potential disputes influence their
behavior.44 The behavior of transnational actors also takes place in the shadow of the law—
including the domestic law that domestic courts interpret and apply in transnational litigation.
Their expectations about how domestic courts will allocate values influence their behavior.45
41

Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 22 (1999). According to Krasner, the institution of
Westphalian sovereignty is based on territoriality and the exclusion of external authority. Id. at 20. The invitation of
foreign authority does not violate international legal sovereignty because it is voluntary, but it does violate
Westphalian sovereignty. Id. at 22.
42
Michael W. Reisman, Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Siegfried Wiessner & Gayl S. Westerman, International Law in
Contemporary Perspective 1381 (2004).
43
See, e.g., Robert N. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979). A more general strategic model of bargaining in the shadow of the law was developed in
Robert Cooter & Stephen Marks with Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. Legal Stud. 225 (1982).
44
See Cooter & Ulen, supra note _, at 398 (“bargaining occurs in the shadow of the law. In other words,
expectations about trials determine the outcomes of bargains”).
45
See, e.g., Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in
GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 158 (2000) (examining the influence of parties’ expectations about
WTO dispute resolution mechanism outcomes on international trade). The notion of transnational behavior in the
shadow of the law is an example of a strategic choice approach to understanding transnational relations. See David
A. Lake & Robert Powell, International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach, in Strategic Choice and
International Relations 8-11 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 1999) and Helen Milner, Rationalizing Politics:
The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics, 52 Int’l Org. 69 (1998) (each noting
that the behavior of transnational actors depends not only on their preferences, but also on their expectations about
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Thus, judicial decisionmaking in transnational litigation has an impact that goes well beyond the
parties to a particular dispute. Simply put, domestic law casts a transnational shadow.46
The nature of the transnational shadow of domestic law can be understood in terms of the
influence domestic law has on the behavior of transnational actors at various stages of their
interactions. As Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet explain:
First, at the level of the single actor, a norm can prevent disputes from arising in the first
place, by providing individuals with behavioral guidance, and by structuring choices
concerning compliance. Second, once a dispute has erupted, norms may provide the . . .
parties with the materials for settling the dispute on their own . . . to the extent that norms
furnish the bases for evaluating both the disputed behavior and potential solutions to the
conflict. Third, existing rule systems help third-party dispute resolvers do their jobs, by
providing templates for determining the nature of the dispute and an appropriate
solution.47
When domestic courts interpret and apply domestic law to transnational activity, the
effects on transnational activity are likewise both direct and indirect. “When a judge decides, the
what other actors will do). However, the shadow of the law can also be understood in terms of normative influence,
with domestic law and domestic courts clarifying norms of transnational behavior. See James G. March & Johan P.
Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders, 52 Int’l Org. 943, 951 (distinguishing the
behavioral logic of consequences from the logic of appropriateness, according to which transnational “[a]ction
involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation”) and
Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet, Law, Politics, and International Governance, in The Politics of International
Law 238 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004) (distinguishing between the material-physical power and the normativeideational power of international law). In effect, the influence of the shadow of the law on transnational actors is
analogous to questions raised in the international compliance literature about how international law may affect state
behavior. See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance,
in Handbook of International Relations 538 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002)
(providing an overview of the international compliance literature) and Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond
the Domestic-International Divide: Toward a Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 Geo. J. Int’l L. 155 (2004) (arguing
that the processes by which law influences behavior are similar for domestic law and international law).
46
Cf. Samuel P. Baumgartner, “Is Transnational Litigation Different?” 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1297, 1305 (2004)
(arguing that “the law applicable to transnational litigation,” which is primarily domestic law, “affects the behavior
of transnational actors”); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In, in Bringing
Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions 3, 25
(Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995) (arguing that “domestic structures mediate, filter, and refract the efforts by
transnational actors and alliances to influence policies”); and Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 Am. J. Int’l L. 205, 230 (1993) (“transnational law [defined as
including domestic law that applies to transnational activity] helps structure patterns of individual and group
interaction in transnational society, patterns that in turn generate interest that shape and constrain state action”). In
addition, domestic law indirectly affects state compliance with international law. Domestic actors may constitute
“compliance constituencies” that either favor or disfavor compliance with international law, depending on their
interests. Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 Int’l Org. 363 (2005); Miles
Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 661 (2000). Domestic law, in turn,
is what “constitutes, empowers, and mobilizes” such groups, “from trade unions, to professional organizations, to
business groups, to environmentalists and human rights activists.” Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope,
Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Law and Politics, 55 Int’l Org. 743, 754 (2001).
47
Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet, Law, Politics, and International Governance, in The Politics of
International Law 238, 245 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004). Although part of a chapter on international law, their
reasoning applies equally well to the influence of domestic law on transnational behavior. See id. at 269 (“we deny
any inherent, theoretically significant, distinction between how international and domestic regimes operate”).
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lawmaking effect of the decision is always twofold. First, in settling the dispute at hand, the
judge produces a legal act that is particular (it binds the two disputants) and retrospective (it
resolves an existing dispute). Second, in justifying the decision, the judge signals that she will
settle similar cases similarly in the future; this legal act is a general and prospective one (it
affects future and potential contractants).”48 As Barry Friedman notes, “In judicial opinions are
found the rules that govern the next case, and thus the conduct of institutions and actors in
society.”49
As the earlier discussion of private law’s distributive and regulatory functions suggests,
domestic law and domestic court decisions applying that law to transnational activity—for
example, in transnational regulatory or transnational private litigation—may have important
indirect effects on transnational economic activity,50 including foreign investment51 and
international trade.52 Likewise, transnational public law litigation may have important effects
that go beyond the parties to a particular dispute. In fact, Harold Koh argues that often the
48

Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and
Governance in the European Community, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 63, 64 (1998). As Sandholtz and Stone Sweet
(2004, 245) explain, “a norm can prevent disputes from arising in the first place, by providing individuals with
behavioral guidance, and by structuring choices concerning compliance. . . . [O]nce a dispute has erupted, norms
may provide the contracting parties with the materials for settling the dispute on their own, dyadically as it were, to
the extent that norms furnish the bases for evaluating both the disputed behavior and potential solutions to the
conflict.”
49
Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 Perspectives on Politics 266 (2006). See also Martin Shapiro & Alec
Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization 213 (2002) (“[b]argaining is facilitated by the knowledge of each
party that, if the two do not reach a consensual resolution to the conflict, the other may go to court and seek an
imposed outcome. Just as important, the previously judicially announced rules that will determine what a court will
impose if litigation does occur fix the parameters within which the two parties bargain even if neither ever goes to
court. The relative legal strengths of the two parties, as defined by those rules judicially announced to resolve
previously litigated disputes, are crucial factors in determining the bargaining strengths of negotiating parties in
other disputes that are not litigated but, in form, are resolved by purely private, consensual agreements”).
50
See discussion at supra, notes _-_. See also Shapiro, supra note _, at 367 (“Some political scientists are studying
multinationals and international trade policy. Both public and private international law . . . play major roles in these
areas. But even as law-oriented political science moves to take up international law again, its preoccupation with
public law and with individual rights analogical to our first ten amendment rights will prevent it from promptly
rendering the assistance it ought to be giving to political scientists studying international political economy”);
Slaughter Burley, supra note _, at 321 (“[H]ow do domestic doctrines encourage or discourage transnational
economic interaction? . . . [One] line of inquiry would link the political findings on the value of stability to the
traditional system of conflicts of law, which long recognized the importance of stable expectations in fostering
transnational commerce”); and Christopher A. Whytock, Taking Causality Seriously in Comparative Constitutional
Law: Insights from Comparative Politics and Comparative Political Economy 16-17 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=926867) (discussing empirical research by comparative political
economists showing the impact of domestic legal institutions on transnational economic activity).
51
See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998) (demonstrating the effects of
domestic law on foreign investment) and Dani Rodrik, Feasible Globalizations 11-12 (Sept. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, available as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9129, available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9129) (noting that “[d]omestic courts may be unwilling—and international courts
unable—to enforce a contract signed between residents of two countries” and arguing that “[a] key reason why more
capital does not flow to poorer countries is that there is no good way that such a promise can be binding across
national jurisdictions—short of resorting to the gunboat diplomacy of old”).
52
See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz et al., Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 163 (2004)
(demonstrating the impact of domestic law on international trade flows) and Baumgartner, supra note _, at 1363
(noting concern among European Union policymakers about the adverse trade consequences of rules governing the
enforcement of foreign judgments).
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prospective consequences of human rights litigation in domestic courts are more important
strategically than its retrospective consequences: “Although [transnational public law plaintiffs’]
announced aim has been retrospective redress, the underlying focus of their actions has been
prospective: to provoke a judicial declaration that the conduct of United States or foreign
government officials violates a norm of international law. To the extent that plaintiffs have won
such judicial declarations, they have sought to use them primarily as political constraints upon
the defendants’ future conduct.”53
In addition, private international law decisionmaking—decisionmaking that allocates
governance authority among sovereign states—has important indirect effects.54 For example,
because transnational activity has connections to more than one state, actors may be uncertain
about which state’s laws are applicable to their cross-border activities. When domestic courts
make decisions allocating prescriptive authority in a particular case, they increase predictability
by providing information about applicable law, making it more likely that transnational actors
will conform their conduct to the law of one state or another (or deliberately seek to avoid that
law).55 Similarly, jurisdictional decisions provide information that influences “forum shopping”
by transnational actors.56 When deciding where to file their lawsuits, plaintiffs consider, among
other things, which state’s laws are most favorable to their claim. For example, if the plaintiff is
53

Koh, supra note _, at 2369. “As in traditional domestic litigation, transnational public lawsuits focus
retrospectively upon achieving compensation and redress for individual victims. But as in traditional international
law litigation, the transnational public law plaintiff pursues a prospective aim as well: to provoke judicial
articulation of a norm of transnational law, with an eye toward using that declaration to promote a political
settlement in which both governmental and nongovernmental entities will participate. Thus, although transnational
public law plaintiffs routinely request retrospective damages or even prospective injunctive relief, their broader
strategic goals are often served by a declaratory or default judgment announcing that a transnational norm has been
violated. Even a judgment that the plaintiff cannot enforce against the defendant in the rendering forum empowers
the plaintiff by creating a bargaining chip for use in other political fora.” Id. at 2349. As for domestic court
decisionmaking in transnational public law litigation, “Although they claim to be resolving disputes in one case
only, [judges] are actually declaring (or not declaring) international norms that litigants transport to other fora for
use in political bargaining. . . . By weaving the doctrinal tapestry that creates, for example, the American Law of
Foreign Sovereignty, they determine the jurisdictional boundaries and conflicts that help shape geopolitical and
economic relationships among America and its global partners. Although judges seek to avoid playing roles in
international politics, they inevitably do so both by deciding cases and by not deciding them. Although they may
claim to be avoiding politics by not deciding cases under international law, such ‘non-decisions’ frequently ally
them with the forces of violence.” Id. at 2395.
54
There is a growing literature that applies a law and economics framework of analysis to understand the effects of
private international law on the behavior of transnational actors and to prescribe ways that private international
law—including domestic rules governing jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of foreign judgments—could
be improved. See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, Two Economists, Three Opinions? Economic Models for Private
International Law—Cross-Border Torts as Example, in An Economic Analysis of Private International Law 143-184
(Jürgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006); Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 Geo.
L.J. 883 (2002); Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24 Berk. J.
Int’l L. _ (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2001);
Michael J. Whincop & Mary Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism in Conflict of Laws (2001). This literature builds on
earlier economic analyses of domestic choice of law, including Erin Ann O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Conflict of
Laws and Choice of Law, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
1999) [available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com] and Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency
in Choice of Law, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1151 (2000).
55
Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws: Foundations and Future Directions 167-175 (1991); Rühl, supra note _, at 9-10,
22.
56
Rühl, supra note _, at 11-15.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=976274

Whytock 12
more likely to win under State A’s law than under State B’s law, the plaintiff may file its lawsuit
in a State A court, even if the transnational activity giving rise to the dispute occurred primarily
in State B. Prior State A court decisions in similar circumstances applying the law of the place
of the underlying transnational activity rather than its own law would discourage this form of
forum shopping, as would State A court decisions dismissing similar cases that arise from
activity occurring outside State A territory.57 In summary, although typically labeled as
“procedural,” these decisions affect the substantive rights and the behavior not only of the parties
to a particular dispute, but also of other transnational actors acting in the transnational shadow of
domestic law.58
Transnational Judicial Governance and Other Forms of Governance. Transnational
judicial governance also indirectly affects transnational activity by facilitating or hindering
alternative approaches to global governance.59 International legal scholars and international
relations scholars have emphasized the role of formal interstate institutions, including
international treaties, as tools of global governance.60 To a great extent, however, the
effectiveness of international institutions depends on domestic legal institutions. For example,
by applying international law to transnational disputes, domestic courts enhance the effectiveness
of formal international governance arrangements; by declining to do so, they limit the
effectiveness of these arrangements.61 Similarly, domestic courts can support private governance
by enforcing contracts. Transnational activity generates transnational conflict which in turn
creates a demand for transnational third-party dispute resolution.62 Without third-party dispute
resolution, “the costs of exchanges may be prohibitive, since each prospective party may doubt
that the other will abide by promises made over the life of a contract.”63 By providing
transnational dispute resolution services, domestic courts help meet this demand, providing an
important global public good that enhances contracting as a form of private governance.64
Likewise, domestic courts can support arbitration as a form of private dispute resolution by
enforcing arbitration agreements and arbitral decisions—or they can undermine it by declining to

57

For discussions of how rules allocating adjudicative and prescriptive authority can affect strategic behavior, see
Brilmayer (1991, 167-175), O’Hara and Ribstein (1999, 634-635), and Whincop and Keyes (26-30).
58
Samuel P. Baumgartner, “Is Transnational Litigation Different?” 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1297, 1298-1299
(2004).
59
For comparisons of interstate, transgovernmental and private governance, see Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C.
Shaffer, eds., Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy (2001) and Whytock, supra note _, at 5-12.
60
Supra, note _.
61
See Buxbaum, supra note _, at 254 (noting that transnational public law litigation often involves “marshaling the
resources of national courts in order to enhance global compliance with international law”); Lea Brilmayer,
International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 Yale L.J. 2277 (1991) (discussing the role of
domestic courts in the enforcement of international law); Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 Int’l Org. 457 (2000) (same); and Harold
Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, Hous. L. Rev. 623 (1998) (same).
62
Stone Sweet & Brunell, supra note _, at 63-64.
63
Id. at 64.
64
As Robert Wai argues, one consequence of this is the potential for “transnational liftoff of international business
transactions from national regulatory oversight.” Robert Wai, 40 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 209, 212 (2002). See also
Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 Wis. Int’l L.J. 149, 152 (1988) (noting that “[t]he judicial
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in international contracts, even where national law prohibits
arbitration of certain statutory causes of action, allows some private parties to exempt themselves from public
regulation of certain transactions”).
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do so.65 As Anne-Marie Slaughter puts it, “the availability of judicial enforcement—the coercive
apparatus of the State—undergirds the entire system of international commercial arbitration.”66
The Decentralized Structure of Transnational Judicial Governance
One of the ways that different forms of governance vary is according to the extent to
which authority is centralized. As Kahler and Lake explain, “[a]uthority can be highly
concentrated—vested in a single, hierarchical entity with claims to exclusive jurisdiction . . . .
Governance can also be widely dispersed among individual nodes exercising only limited
jurisdiction.”67 Transnational judicial governance is characterized by an extremely low degree of
centralization. It consists of domestic courts around the world acting as global governors,
allocating values among transnational actors and governance authority among states. They do so
independently, and although there are a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements dealing
with private international law matters, transnational judicial governance takes place outside the
context of any overarching hierarchical arrangement.68
Given the highly decentralized nature of transnational judicial governance, the limited
ability of domestic courts to unilaterally allocate governance authority needs to be emphasized,
even though international legal scholars commonly use the term “allocation” to refer to the
distribution of adjudicative, prescriptive and enforcement authority among states.69 Even if a
State A court asserts its own governance authority over a particular transnational activity, it
cannot prevent State B from also asserting authority over that activity. There is not “an impartial
mechanism of hierarchically superior authority for resolving such conflicts.”70 Conversely, even
if State A defers to State B’s governance authority, it cannot compel State B to exercise that
authority. How authority actually is allocated ultimately is the aggregate result of decisions by
courts of multiple states. Thus, authority allocation generally should be understood as a
collective function, although not necessarily a coordinated function, of transnational judicial
governance.71
65

For an overview of the rules governing the enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, see Gary B.
Born, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts: Commentary and Materials chap. _ (3d ed. 1996).
66
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur. J. Int’l L. 503, 519 (1995). See also
Slaughter Burley, supra note _, at 232 (highlighting “the intersection of the public and private spheres underpinning
a law that formally regulates individual merchants outside national legal systems but is ultimately dependent on
them”).
67
Kahler & Lake, supra note _, at 8.
68
Transnational judicial governance also is decentralized in another sense: domestic courts generally can only hear
cases that are brought to them by other actors who file their suits as plaintiffs. See Jack Knight & James Johnson,
The Priority of Democracy: A Pragmatist Approach to Political-Economic Institutions and the Burden of
Justification, 101 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 47, 58 (2007) (noting that “the agenda setting power in judicial institutions is
largely exogenous. Although judges often are authorized to refuse to hear various kinds of cases, they typically
cannot initiate causes of action. The must instead rely on interested parties to bring controversies before the
court.”). However, “it is nevertheless the machinery of the state that transnational litigation uses to achieve a
regulatory end.” Buxbaum, supra note _, at 304.
69
See, e.g., Carter & Trimble, supra note _, at 699-700; Reisman et al., supra note _, at 1381-1383; and Joseph
Modeste Sweeney, Covey T. Oliver & Noyes E. Leech, Cases and Materials on the International Legal System 8283 (3d ed. 1988).
70
Scoles, Hay, Borchers & Symeonides, supra note _, at 2.
71
As Easton stresses, the authoritative allocation of values “does not imply or assume that a central governmental
organization is required in order to make decisions and effectuate them. Institutional devices for making and
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Transnational Judicial Governance, Transgovernmental Networks, and the Legalization of
World Politics
Finally, the nature of transnational judicial governance can be clarified by comparing it to
two related concepts: transgovernmental networks and the legalization of world politics.
Transnational judicial governance may sometimes take the form of transgovernmental relations,
defined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye as “sets of direct interactions among subunits of
different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or
chief executives of those governments,”72 or transgovernmental networks, defined by AnneMarie Slaughter as “pattern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like government units
working across . . . borders.”73 Often, however—perhaps most of the time—domestic courts
make transnational judicial governance decisions outside the context of any network of regular
and purposive relations with foreign courts. Without diminishing the significance of
transjudicial communication and transgovernmental networks of judges as emerging forms of
global governance, my impression is that most transnational judicial governance decisions are
made by busy trial court judges that generally will not have the time or resources to consult with
foreign counterparts before making decisions having transnational implications.74
Transnational judicial governance also is related to but distinct from what Kenneth
Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal
conceptualize as the legalization of world politics.75 They define legalization as “a particular set
of characteristics that institutions may (or may not) possess”: obligation, precision, and

executing policy may take an infinite variety of forms.” Easton, Political System, supra note _, at 137. For this
reason, he deemed it appropriate to conceive of international politics as well as domestic politics in terms of
authoritative allocation of values. Id. at 138-141. A process of authoritative allocation of values can exist “even
though the devices may be less formal and even though there may be few, if any, legally recognized means for
enforcing decisions. The form of the mechanism and the kind of sanctions are, however, matters for empirical
investigation; they do not invalidate the conclusion that there is discernible a process whereby values are
authoritatively allocated for the whole society.” Id. at 141.
72
Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 World
Pol. 39, 43 (1974).
73
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 14 and chap. 2 (2004). See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology
of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. of Rich. L. Rev. 99 (1994) (on “transjudicial communication”) and Melissa
A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing
International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487 (2005) (on “transnational judicial communication”). For a review of the
literature on transgovernmental networks, see Slaughter & Zaring, supra note _.
74
In other words, it may be true, as Anne-Marie Slaughter notes, that there is an “increasing ability for transnational
disputes to be resolved in . . . several forums that are coordinating with one another.” Slaughter, New World Order,
supra note _, at 102. For example, as Jay Westbrook has documented, there are instances of direct interactions
between U.S. and foreign courts in cross-border insolvency proceedings. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International
Judicial Negotiation, 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 567 (2003). However, I am not convinced, based on the available evidence,
that this type of coordination is widespread, at least insofar as it involves U.S. district courts, nor am I convinced
that such coordination, however desirable it might be, is likely to become routine in the immediate future given the
intense workload and limited resources of district court judges. Eventually, however, perhaps district court judges
will find that transgovernmental cooperation may be a way of increasing the efficiency with which they resolve
transnational disputes.
75
Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter & Duncan Snidal, The
Concept of Legalization, 54 Int’l Org. 401 (2000).
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delegation.76 According to their concept, “[o]bligation means that states or other actors are
bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of rules or commitments. . . . Precision means that
rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation means
that third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to
resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules.”77 Like legalized institutions,
transnational judicial governance involves the setting, application and enforcement of rules that
often have relatively high levels of obligation and precision, and it implies high levels of
delegation, given that domestic courts have the authority to determine which state’s rules apply
to transnational activity and to interpret and implement those rules. Thus, both concepts are
about the role of “legalized” institutions in world politics. However, Abbott et al. emphasize the
international institutional foundations of legalized world politics,78 whereas the institutional
foundations of transnational judicial governance are principally domestic—namely, domestic
courts and domestic law, including the domestic rules of private international law.79
Conceptually speaking, transnational judicial governance nevertheless might be considered an
example of the legalization of world politics; Abbott et al.’s focus on international institutions
may simply be a matter of empirical emphasis. But the more important point of this comparison
is that the legalization of world politics does not necessarily require highly legalized
international institutions.80 More broadly, the point is that global governance cannot be fully
understood without examining its domestic legal foundations. The concept of transnational
judicial governance provides a point of departure for studying those foundations.
II. GOVERNANCE-ORIENTED ANALYSIS OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
Notwithstanding the important role of domestic courts in global governance, we know
very little about how domestic courts actually behave as global governors and why they govern
the way they do. Few legal scholars have engaged in systematic empirical research on private
international law,81 and political scientists studying judicial behavior have focused almost

76

Id. at 37.
Id.
78
See id. at 406, Table 1 (listing international institutions). However, at least one contribution to the special issue of
International Organization that introduced the legalization concept stresses the role that domestic courts play in the
domestic enforcement of international norms. See Keohane et al., supra note _.
79
Another way of putting it is that even when an international institution’s level of delegation is low, it generally
will be more centralized than transnational judicial governance in the sense that its rules, unlike most rules of private
international law, are agreed upon by member states. Critics of the legalization concept have called for greater
attention to be paid to domestic law. Finnemore & Toope, supra note _, at 754. But even their critique neglects
private international law, which is the primarily domestic body of law that guides courts as they engage in
transnational judicial governance.
80
Alternatively, if transnational judicial governance is itself treated as an international institution, the point would
be that international institutions with very low levels of centralization may be able to impart disproportionately high
levels of legalization to transnational relations.
81
Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg’s 1996 study of foreign parties in U.S. courts might be considered an
exception. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1120
(1996). In contrast, there have been several systematic empirical studies of domestic conflict of laws
decisionmaking in U.S. courts. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 357 (1992), Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24
Georgia L. Rev. 49 (1989), and Stuart E. Thiel, Choice of Law and the Home-Court Advantage: Evidence, 2 Am. L.
& Econ. Rev. 291 (2000).
77
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exclusively on matters of domestic policy.82 For their part, international relations scholars have
virtually ignored private international law and domestic courts.83 This lack of knowledge is
significant not only because it limits our understanding of transnational legal processes, but also
because it limits our ability to evaluate critically the real-world consequences of transnational
law, including how it actually is applied by courts and how it affects the behavior of
transnational actors. The goal of the governance-oriented approach to transnational law is to
improve our knowledge of transnational judicial governance, both descriptively and causally,
and to begin construction of an empirical foundation for normative analysis of transnational law
in action. This part of the paper explains the governance-oriented approach by describing its two
principal features, namely its focus on transnational law in action and its focus on the broad
implications of domestic court decisionmaking for transnational activity, and by highlighting its
affinities with legal realism and the New Haven school of international law.
Focus on Transnational Law in Action: Governance-Oriented Analysis as Complement to
Doctrinal Analysis
International law and international relations scholars generally have emphasized the role
of international institutions, including international rules and international organizations, as the
main instruments that states use to regulate transnational activity. Resisting this preoccupation
with interstate forms of governance, Philip Jessup argued in 1956 for an alternative conception
of “the law applicable to the complex interrelated world community.”84 Jessup pointed out that
“the term ‘international’ is misleading since it suggests that one is concerned only with the
relations of one nation (or state) to other nations (or states).”85 In its place, he proposed the
82

Exceptions include studies on U.S. federal court decisionmaking in matters involving human rights, Jeffrey Davis,
Justice Without Borders: Human Rights Cases in U.S. Courts, 28 Law & Policy 60 (2006), and international trade,
Isaac Unah, The Courts of International Trade: Judicial Specialization, Expertise, and Bureaucratic Policy-Making
(1998).
83
See Baumgartner, supra note _, at 1384-1385 (“[b]ecause international relations scholars have paid relatively little
attention to [transnational] litigation procedure, the pathways through which such procedure may affect the behavior
of groups and individuals as well as that of states—particularly procedural law’s correlation with transnational
economic interaction—are still relatively poorly understood and thus would offer interesting avenues of research for
international relations scholars interested in the transnational litigation setting”). This general lack of attention has
persisted notwithstanding calls by Martin Shapiro and Anne-Marie Slaughter in the 1990s for political scientists to
explore the implications of private international law. Shapiro, supra note _, at 367; Slaughter Burley, supra note _,
at 231. To date, one of the only examples of systematic empirical work on judicial behavior by an international
relations scholar is Tonya Putnam’s important and innovative study of extraterritorial application of U.S. statutory
and constitutional rules by U.S. federal courts. Tonya L. Putnam, Courts Without Borders? Extraterritoriality as a
Mechanism for Global Governance, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association,
March 22, 2006. See also Whytock, Transnational Judicial Governance, supra note _ (an empirical analysis of
forum non conveniens decisionmaking by U.S. district courts from the perspective of international relations theory).
In addition, there has been theoretical and qualitative work by international relations scholars on the role of domestic
courts in European integration. See, e.g., Karen Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European law: The Making of
an International Rule of Law in Europe (2001); Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A
Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 Int’l Org. 41 (1993); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing
a Supranational Constitution: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 63 (1998). In contrast, international relations scholars are increasingly interested in international courts. See,
e.g., Alter, supra note _, Cichowski, supra note _, Voeten, supra note _, and Volcanoes & Stack, supra note _.
84
Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law 1 (1956).
85
Id. Interestingly, it was only some time later that American international relations scholars made a similar critique
of then-mainstream international relations theory, proposing a “world politics” approach encompassing not only
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concept of “transnational law,” which he defined as the body of law “which regulates actions or
events that transcend national frontiers,” a concept meant to embody both public and private
international law.86 Challenging the distinction between national and international as a basis for
legal classification, he explicitly included in his definition domestic legal rules that apply to
transnational activity.87
The governance-oriented approach involves not only doctrinal analysis of transnational
law, but also empirical and normative analysis of transnational law in action—that is,
transnational law as it is actually applied by domestic courts to allocate values among
transnational actors.88 This is important for several reasons. First, because transnational judicial
governance is a form of judicial behavior—namely, domestic courts behaving as global
governors—the focus on law in action is necessary as a descriptive matter, for it is not plausible
to assume that legal doctrine alone fully describes this behavior. To pursue its descriptive goal,
the governance-oriented approach deploys standard methods of descriptive inference to identify
broad patterns of judicial decisionmaking in transnational litigation.89 Second, the focus on
transnational law in action is important for explaining why domestic courts behave the way they
do as global governors, for it is not plausible to assume that legal doctrine is necessarily the only
determinant of judicial decisionmaking in transnational litigation.90 To pursue its explanatory
goal, the governance-oriented approach relies on both qualitative and statistical methods of
causal inference.91 In both of these ways, the governance-oriented approach has an affinity with
legal realism,92 extending core realist insights to transnational law.93 Third, the focus on
interstate relations, but also transnational relations—“contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries
that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments.” Joseph S. Nye, Jr., & Robert O.
Keohane, Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction, 25 Int’l Org. 329, 331 (1971).
86
Id. at 2. Anne-Marie Slaughter proposes a narrower definition of transnational law: “all municipal law and a
subset of intergovernmental agreements that directly regulate transnational activity between individuals and between
individuals and state governments.” Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, 87 Am. J. Int’l L. 205, 230 (1993). Because I
understand transnational judicial governance as encompassing the role of domestic courts in the governance of
activity involving only states—as in some instances of transnational public law litigation (see Koh, supra note _, at
_), I use Jessup’s definition. See also Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law
738 (Jan Smits ed., 2006) (providing an overview of the development of the concept of transnational law).
87
Id. at 70 and 106.
88
See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. _, 15 (1910) (“if we look closely,
distinctions between law in the books and law in action, between the rules that purport to govern the relations of
man and man and those that in fact govern them, will appear, and it will be found that today also the distinction
between legal theory and judicial administration is often a very real and a very deep one”).
89
See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane & Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry chap. 2 (1994) and Lee Epstein &
Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chic. L. Rev. 1, 29-34 (2002) (explaining basic methods of descriptive
inference).
90
To the contrary, in addition to skeptics in the legal academy ranging from legal realists to critical legal scholars, a
substantial body of judicial decisionmaking research provides strong evidence that legal doctrine is not the only
explanatory factor. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making,
86 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 323 (1991) (providing an overview of the literature and a nuanced empirical analysis) and
Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 Perspectives on Politics 261 (2006) (criticizing the excessive skepticism
about law’s influence that pervades much of the political science literature on judicial decisionmaking).
91
See King et al., supra note _, chap. 3, and Epstein & King, supra note _, at 34-37 (explaining basic methods of
causal inference).
92
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 12361237 (1931) (attributing to the legal realist movement a “[d]istrust of traditional legal rules and concepts insofar as
they purport to describe what either courts or people are actually doing” and a “distrust of the theory that traditional
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transnational law in action is normatively important. As explained above, judicial
decisionmaking in transnational litigation has not only direct effects on the litigants to particular
disputes, but also broad indirect implications for transnational relations more generally.94
Transnational legal decisionmaking therefore demands critical assessment just as much as
transnational legal doctrine does.95 There is again an affinity with legal realism—“[w]e first
must determine how law is working, so that when we set forth our own ideals, we can say how
present law is actually fitted to them”96—as well as with the New Haven school of international
law, which seeks to provide, “in lieu of anecdotal historicism, for the systematic description of
past trends in decision in terms of their approximations to clarified goals.”97
Yet just as an exclusive focus on transnational legal doctrine is insufficient from a
governance-oriented perspective, so is an exclusive focus on law in action. To adopt the
Holmesean equation of law with “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact”98 is to
conflate what the governance-oriented approach wants to explain (the behavior of courts as
global governors) with a potentially important explanatory variable (legal doctrine), making
causal inference impossible.99 It also complicates the common conception of the rule of law as
prescriptive rule-formulations are the heavily operative factor in producing court decisions,” while emphasizing
that). Some political science approaches to the study of judicial behavior which have been criticized for their
“almost pathological skepticism that law matters.” Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 Perspectives on
Politics 261, 262 (2006). See also Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 251 (making a similar argument). Although my
approach is indeed skeptical insofar as it treats the extent and nature of the influence of legal rules on judicial
decisionmaking as a question to be investigated empirically in various settings rather than something to be assumed,
my approach takes seriously the role of transnational law in influencing the behavior of domestic courts as global
governors, as explained below, infra, notes _-_, and accompanying text. As Llewellyn himself emphasized,
“‘distrust’ in this . . . point is not at all equivalent to ‘negation in any given instance.’” Llewellyn, supra note _, at
1237.
93
In this sense, the governance-oriented approach also has an affinity with the emerging “new legal realism.” See
Howard Erlanger, Bryant Garth, Jane Larson, Elizabeth Mertz, Victoria Nourse & David Wilkins, Is It Time for a
New Legal Realism? 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 335, 343 (2005) (noting that “[l]egal realism originally had a purely
domestic focus, but now it is impossible for legal scholars to ignore transnational issues and arenas. One of the key
tests of New Legal Realism will be its success in taking on major issues involved with the so-called ‘globalization of
law’”).
94
See supra, notes _-_, and accompanying text.
95
Cf. Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence: The “New Institutionalism,” and the Future of Public Law, 82 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 89, 106 (“[r]esearch that identifies actual patterns in legal and political discourse and their
consequences, testing their significance versus that of other structural contexts, should enable public law scholars to
argue more powerfully about the values U.S. law has really embodied historically, about the way these values have
shaped, and been shaped by, political conflicts, and about the results they have furthered or forestalled”).
96
William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz, & Thomas A. Reed, American Legal Realism 52 (1993) (describing
Llewellyn’s contribution). See also Llewellyn, supra note _, at 1236-1237 (arguing for a “temporary divorce of Is
and Ought for purposes of study” on the ground that “no judgment of what Ought to be done in the future with
respect to any part of law can be intelligently made without knowing objectively, as far as possible, what that part of
law is now doing”).
97
Myres S. McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical Concepts about International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of
Inquiry, 4 J. Conflict Res. 337, 344 (1960).
98
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. _, _ (1897).
99
Cf. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 Int’l Org. 887,
892 (1998) (“[b]ecause one central question of norms research is the effect of norms on state behavior, it is
important to operationalize a norm in a way that is distinct from the state or the nonstate behavior it is designed to
explain”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=976274

Whytock 19
including among its values judicial decisionmaking in accordance with recognized legal
principles, a conception which becomes normatively incoherent if law and judicial
decisionmaking are not kept analytically distinct. For these reasons, it is important to emphasize
that the governance-oriented approach’s emphasis on transnational law in action is a complement
to, not a substitute for, doctrinal analysis.
Focus on Broad Implications for Transnational Activity: Governance-Oriented Analysis as
Complement to Litigant-Oriented Analysis
Judicial decisionmaking in transnational litigation obviously has implications for the
parties to a particular lawsuit, and for this reason litigant-oriented analysis is of self-evident
importance. But to understand transnational judicial governance, it also is necessary to focus on
the broader implications of domestic court decisionmaking for transnational activity, including
the indirect effects discussed above.100 This focus may involve assessment of judicial
decisionmaking in transnational litigation in terms of the values that one thinks should
characterize systems of governance as a whole, such as the rule-of-law values I will use below to
assess the allocation of adjudicative authority by U.S. district courts in context of the forum non
conveniens doctrine.101 Alternatively, it may involve using methods of causal inference to test
hypotheses about the effects of domestic law and domestic court decisionmaking on
transnational activity,102 an approach that resonates with the legal realist “insistence on
evaluation of any part of law in terms of its effects, and an insistence on the worthwhileness of
trying to find these effects.”103
One implication of the governance-oriented approach’s focus on the broad implications
of domestic court decisionmaking on transnational activity is an effort to identify broad patterns
of judicial decisionmaking in transnational litigation: judges affect society, and “[t]hey do this
mainly through the precedential force of their decisions, since a single decision rarely (not never)
has a big impact.”104 A related implication is an emphasis on decisions that are published. The
broad indirect effects of domestic court decisionmaking on transnational activity are largely due
to the signals it transmits to transnational actors.105 Because publication is the principal mode of
transmission, unpublished decisions are unlikely to have such effects. Publication, in other

100

See supra, notes _-_, and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
102
For examples of research by comparative political economists that might provide a model for this type of
governance-oriented analysis of transnational law, see supra, note _. Moreover, the relationship between
transnational judicial governance and other systems of governance, discussed supra, notes _-_ and accompanying
text, suggests that more dynamic analyses of how these systems interact may also be promising. See, e.g., Tim
Büthe, Governance through Private Authority: Non-State Actors in World Politics, 58 J. Int’l Affairs 281, 284
(2004) (arguing that global governance scholars should explore “the role of the state in [the] empowerment of
private actors”).
103
Llewellyn, supra note _, at 1236-1237 (also noting the realist movement’s “conception of the law as a means to
social ends and not as an end in itself; so that any part needs constantly to be examined for its purpose, and for its
effect, and to be judged in the light of both and of their relation to each other”).
104
Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev.
1, 18 (1993)
105
See supra, notes _-_, and accompanying text.
101
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words, is what gives domestic law its transnational shadow.106 Unpublished decisions are, of
course, important to the litigants affected by those decisions. For this reason, and because of the
importance of fairness and justice considerations in individual cases, the governance-oriented
approach’s focus on broad implications for transnational activity is a complement to, but not a
substitute for, litigant-oriented analysis.
III. POLITICS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE:
THE CASE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
To illustrate the governance-oriented approach, I will apply it to the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.107 This doctrine allows a domestic court to dismiss an action in favor of a
foreign court on the ground that the foreign court is a more appropriate and convenient forum for
adjudicating the controversy.108 Forum non conveniens is an interesting object of governanceoriented analysis for at least two reasons. First, it explicitly involves the allocation of
governance authority among states—adjudicative authority, to be precise—which is one of the
core functions of transnational judicial governance discussed above.109 By examining forum non
106

Although theoretically motivated, the focus on published decisions—by which I mean not only decisions that are
published in official reporters such as the Federal Supplement, but also those that are reported in widely accessible
electronic databases such as LexisNexis or Westlaw—may, depending on the circumstances, make it difficult to
generalize findings to the overall population of published and unpublished decisions. Whytock, Transnational
Judicial Governance, supra note _, at 28-29. Cf. Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through
Published Cases: A Research Note, 15 Justice System J. 782, 795 (1992) (generally critical of reliance on published
decisions, but noting that such an approach “may be most justifiable for a researcher who is trying to study
efficiently the ‘public policy’ output of district courts”).
107
I also am engaged in governance-oriented studies of other doctrinal fields of transnational litigation, including
international choice of law, foreign sovereign immunity, and enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments,
results of which should be available before the end of summer 2007.
108
Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corporation, 549 U.S. _, slip op. at 1 (2007).
The Supreme Court’s seminal statement of the modern doctrine of forum non conveniens is Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The doctrine was clarified in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). For
overviews of the doctrine, see Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 3828 (2007), and Gary B. Born, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts:
Commentary and Materials chap. 4 (3d ed. 1996).
109
See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-507 (“[i]n all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into play,
it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for
choice between them”); Piper, 454 U.S. at 255 (“[a]t the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must
determine whether there exists an alternative forum”); and Sinochem, 549 U.S. slip op. at 1 (under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, “a federal court may dismiss an action on the ground that a court abroad is the more
appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating the controversy”) and at 8 (“[a] forum non conveniens dismissal .
. . is a determination that the merits should be adjudicated elsewhere”). See also Allan R. Stein, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. Penn. L. Rev. 781, 786 (describing forum non
conveniens “as a means of allocating political authority”). Although courts often make forum non conveniens
dismissal subject to the condition that the defendant submit to personal jurisdiction in the foreign forum, John Bies,
Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 489 (2000), there is evidence that most cases that are
dismissed by U.S. district courts on forum non conveniens grounds are not in fact continued in the proposed foreign
court. David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather Fantastic Fiction,” 103
L.Q. Rev. 398, 417-421 (1987). However, as Ralf Michaels argues, “this only suggests that the foreign forum is less
attractive than the one where the suit was first brought; it does not suggest that multilateral considerations are not
taken seriously.” Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1003, 1037 (2006). The
limitations of the terms “allocation” and “deference,” discussed supra at notes _-_, nevertheless merit reiteration in
this context.
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conveniens decisionmaking in action, we may be able to develop a more certain understanding of
how this allocative function of transnational judicial governance works in practice, and what
legal and non-legal factors influence the choices judges make between the assertion of domestic
governance authority and deference to foreign governance authority over transnational activity.
Second, forum non conveniens offers an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of domestic
courts in fostering transnational rule of law.110 By examining broad patterns of forum non
conveniens decisionmaking, we may be able to shed some light on the compatibility of forum
non conveniens practice with rule-of-law values such as predictability and impartiality.111 This
part of the paper therefore focuses on descriptive and causal inference—that is, it seeks not only
to describe how domestic courts behave as global governors in the forum non conveniens
context, but also why they govern the way they do—and it uses these inferences as an empirical
foundation for normatively evaluating transnational judicial governance according to rule-of-law
values. The basis for these inferences is statistical and qualitative analysis of an original dataset
of over 200 randomly selected published forum non conveniens decisions by United States
District Court judges between 1990 and 2005.112
Before beginning the analysis, I must be explicit about the rule-of-law values that I will
use to normatively evaluate the role of domestic courts in global governance,113 both of which I
draw from the work of H.L.A. Hart: predictability and impartiality.114 By predictability, I mean
110

Thus, the focus on forum non conveniens allows me to explicitly address the topic of the panel for which this
paper was prepared, namely “the development and effectiveness of different institutions in fostering the international
‘rule of law.’” I prefer the term “transnational” rule of law, to emphasize that nonstate actors as well as states are
active participants.
111
A third reason is that forum non conveniens is a quantitatively important form of transnational judicial
governance decisionmaking. I estimate that U.S. district courts have published at least 691 transnational forum non
conveniens decisions between 1990 and 2006, with 95 percent certainty that the actual number is between 613 and
775. Whytock, supra note _, at 15. See also Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens
Analysis, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 309, 311 (2002) (“[e]very year, federal courts consider hundreds of motions for forum non
conveniens dismissal”).
112
See Whytock, supra note _, at 17-18, for details about how the dataset was developed, and at 28-29, for the
reasons for focusing on published cases (defined as those published in official reporters or available in the
LexisNexis database) as well as the threats to inference that this focus may entail.
113
The proper meaning of “rule of law” is debated, and I will make no effort here to contribute to that debate. See
Erik G. Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse Institutional Patterns and
Reformers’ Responses, in Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law 336, 338 (Erick
G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003) (briefly summarizing the debate).
114
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed. 1994). Cf. Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law, in
Democracy and the Rule of Law 19 (José Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003) (emphasizing “two
features of the rule of law as commonly understood: predictability and equality”). These values are shared by rule
of law concepts that insist that “laws have become widely known and understood, and where they are applied
equally to everyone.” Jensen, supra note _, at 338. The values of predictability and impartiality imply a functional
rather than a substantive conception of the rule of law. By functional, I mean what Martin Shapiro labels a
“primitive” notion of the rule of law which “requires only that the state’s preferences be achieved by general rules
rather than by discretionary—arbitrary—treatment of individuals,” but “[t]here is not even a hint in this concept that
the law is neutral as between the citizens or independent of the will of the state.” Martin Shapiro, The Success of
Judicial Review and Democracy, in On Law, Politics, and Judicialization 149, 166 (eds. Martin Shapiro & Alec
Stone Sweet, 2002). By substantive notions of the rule of law, I mean those that equate the rule of law with “the
rule of norms that are just and true in some universal sense and thus of laws that are neutral and independent in
relation to the particular immediate preference of the government. Then the rule of law comes to forbid not only
arbitrary state behavior directed against particular individuals but bad state behavior even when the behavior is in
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the degree of certainty transnational actors have about the rules that will be applied to govern
their behavior. Thus, in an ideal rule-of-law system, there must be “a rule for conclusive
identification of the primary rules of obligation.”115 Moreover, rules “must be intelligible and
within the capacity of most to obey, and in general they must not be retrospective.”116 Courts
play a particularly important role in fostering predictability; yet the use of court decisions “as
authoritative guides to the rules depends on a somewhat shaky inference from particular
decisions, and the reliability of this must fluctuate both with the skill of the interpreter and the
consistency of the judges.”117 By impartiality, I mean “the notion that what is to be applied to a
multiplicity of different persons is the same general rule, undeflected by prejudice, interest, or
caprice.”118 Impartiality thus implies not only equal treatment under the law, but also that courts
must allocate values according to recognized legal rules—including, in the case of transnational
judicial governance, domestic rules of transnational law—not according to political or other
extra-legal criteria.119
Rule of Law Outcomes? Patterns of Forum Non Conveniens Decisionmaking
The governance-oriented approach calls for an understanding of forum non conveniens in
action. In particular, how do U.S. district court judges actually apply the doctrine to
transnational actors? Without such an understanding, normative criticism is limited to what the
doctrine says. The governance-oriented approach uses basic methods of descriptive inference to
the form of rules.” Id. On the functional/substantive distinction, see Matthew Stephenson, Rule of Law as a Goal of
Development Policy, World Bank, available at http://go.worldbank.org/SK9CKPG830.
115
Hart, supra note _, at 95. Because they determine which state’s laws apply to transnational activity, the
principles of international choice of law play an extraordinarily important role in fostering this rule-of-law value in
transnational relations, a role which I am exploring in related research.
116
Id. at 207. As Stephen Holmes notes, discussing Machiavelli’s conception of the rule of law, “[c]itizens become
attached to a rule-of-law regime . . . because it makes it possible for them to predict the consequences of their
actions, to pursue remedy when wronged, and generally to plan their lives.” Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule
of Law, in Democracy and the Rule of Law 19, 21 and 32 (José Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003)
(noting that Machiavelli’s conception is incomplete “because it focuses only on legal certainty as the offspring of
regularized constraints on state power” whereas “[w]e ordinarily associate the rule of law not only with
predictability but also with a roughly equal treatment of social groups”).
117
Hart, supra note _, at 97.
118
Id. at 206. This is a functional rather than a substantive rule-of-law value, as Hart emphasizes: “though the most
odious laws may be justly applied, we have, in the bare notion of applying a general rule of law, the germ at least of
justice.” Id.
119
See Jensen, supra note _, at 338 (noting that some rule of law concepts attach special importance to legal
limitations on the scope of legitimate state action). Arbitrariness and unfettered discretion in judicial
decisionmaking is inconsistent with both of these values: with predictability, because it generates uncertainty, and
impartiality, because it implies that factors other than publicly recognized primary rules are influencing the
allocation of values. As Ronald Dworkin puts it, “the most abstract and fundamental point of legal practice is to
guide and constrain the power of government in the following way. Law insists that force not be used or withheld,
no matter how useful that would be to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or noble these ends, except as licensed
or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about when collective force
is justified. The law of a community on this account is the scheme of rights and responsibilities that meet that
complex standard: they license coercion because they flow from past decisions of the right sort. They are therefore
‘legal’ rights and responsibilities. This characterization of the concept of law sets out, in suitably airy form, what is
sometimes called the ‘rule’ of law.” Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 93 (1986). It should be noted, however, that
discretion may serve other important values, such as fairness, even if it is not easily squared with functional
understandings of the rule of law.
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provide the empirical foundations necessary to extend normative analysis to what courts actually
do in the forum non conveniens context and, more precisely, to explore the extent to which
forum non conveniens decisionmaking conforms to the rule-of-law values of predictability and
impartiality.
Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal Rates and Transnational Rule of Law. In Gulf Oil v.
Gilbert (1947), the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that “the plaintiff’s choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed” under the forum non conveniens doctrine.120 In practice, however, dismissal
on forum non conveniens grounds is not rare at all. U.S. district courts grant the motions, thus
deferring to foreign adjudicative authority, approximately 47 percent of the time in published
decisions between 1990 and 2005 (see Table 1 below).121 Beyond being bad news for
plaintiffs,122 this has mixed implications for the transnational rule of law. On the one hand, the
evidence raises questions about whether forum non conveniens in action, which results in
frequent dismissals, is inconsistent with forum non conveniens doctrine, which says dismissal
should be rare, contrary to the rule-of-law values of predictability and impartiality. One cannot,
however, attribute too much legal meaning to this apparent disparity between practice and
doctrine without understanding potential case selection effects.123 Although it is possible that the
high dismissal rate indicates unfaithful application of Supreme Court precedents, an alternative
explanation might be that plaintiffs simply file a disproportionate number of transnational suits
in U.S. courts under factual circumstances that genuinely merit dismissal under the doctrine.124
On the other hand, the 47 percent estimate might be interpreted as good news for the
transnational rule of law. Regardless of case selection effects, it indicates clearly that U.S.
district courts are willing to defer to foreign adjudicative authority, and to do so frequently;125
and it suggests that, at a minimum, claims about the parochialism of American private
international law doctrine126 may deserve qualification. The dismissal rate might even be

120

330 Gilbert, U.S. at 508. See also [] (all emphasizing the high standard that a defendant must meet to succeed on
a forum non conveniens motion).
121
I estimate the dismissal rate at 47 percent, with 95 percent certainty, using an Agresti-Coull confidence interval,
that the actual rate is between 41 and 54 percent. It is important to note that because my dataset includes only
published decisions (including those published in the Federal Supplement or in widely available electronic databases
such as NexisLexis and Westlaw), generalizing any of the descriptive inferences in this paper to the overall
population of forum non conveniens decisions may entail substantially lower levels of certainty.
122
The Supreme Court in Piper, 454 U.S. at 252, explicitly stated that one rationale for the forum non conveniens
doctrine is to discourage forum shopping by plaintiffs.
123
For a very useful discussion of selection effects, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation
Realities, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 119 (2002). Early work on selection effects, criticized by Clermont & Eisenberg,
actually implies that win rates generally should approximate 50 percent. [Priest & Klein] In addition, it is possible
that the dismissal rate is substantially lower in unpublished cases, which would not be altogether surprising if one
assumes that judges feel a particularly important need to publicly justify dismissals. However, a Pearson chisquared test of independence does not support this hypothesis: It indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that there is no association between dismissal and whether or not a U.S. district court forum non conveniens decision
is published in the Federal Reporter (p=.655).
124
See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 (clarifying that dismissal should be rare “unless the balance is strongly in favor of
the defendant”).
125
My data suggests that U.S. district courts have deferred to foreign adjudicative authority in the forum non
conveniens context at least 350 times between 1990 and 2005. Whytock, supra note _, at 15.
126
See, e.g., (“”).
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interpreted as circumstantial evidence of an emerging “global community of courts”127
characterized by “the awareness of judges in every country and at every level of participation in
a common judicial enterprise,”128 a notion of judicial comity according to which “courts in
different nations are entitled to their fair share of disputes,”129 and decisions to “defer to or reject
their foreign counterparts” for reasons other than “sovereign prerogatives.”130 But Table 2 also
suggests that the likelihood of deference to foreign adjudicative authority is on a decline—
perhaps due to changes in the partisan composition of the U.S. government or the post 9/11
political climate.131 Like other forms of cooperation, the global community of courts—or at least
participation in it by U.S. courts on the basis of judicial comity—may be influenced by the ebbs
and flows of domestic politics.132
Table 1: Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal Rates, Published U.S. District Court
Decisions, 1990-2005
Overall
210

1990-1994
62

1995-1999
60

2000-2005
88

Estimated Dismissal Rate

47.1

61.3

45.0

38.6

95% Confidence Interval

40.5, 53.9

48.8, 72.4

33.1, 57.5

29.1, 49.1

Number of Decisions

Notes: There is 95% certainty that the actual dismissal rate in the overall population of published U.S. district court
forum non conveniens decisions is between the two values indicated in the “95% Confidence Interval” row.
Agresti-Coull 95% confidence interval reported. A Pearson chi-squared test of independence indicates that we can
reject with more than 95% confidence the null hypothesis that there is no association between dismissal and the
three time periods (p=.022).

Finally, the forum non conveniens doctrine sends mixed signals about the likelihood of
dismissal, which reduces the rule-of-law value of predictability, and increases the ambiguity of
the doctrine’s forum shopping implications. On the one hand, the Supreme Court, as just noted,
has emphasized that dismissal should be rare and that substantial deference is owed to the
plaintiff’s choice of forum.133 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has stated that the
127

Slaughter, New World Order, supra note _, at 100.
Id. at 102.
129
Id. at 87.
130
Id. at 91.
131
During 1990-1994, both houses of Congress were Democratic and in 1993 and 1994 the president was also
Democratic (overall, a Democratic political environment); in 1995-1999, both houses of Congress were Republican
and the president was Democratic (split political environment); and in most of the 2000-2005, both houses of
Congress were Republican and the president was Republican (overall, a Republican political environment. Strategic
theories of judicial decisionmaking would expect the political environment to have such an impact, but in a
statistical analysis that controlled for other factors, I did not find strong empirical support for this proposition. This
trend is even more interesting in light of the simultaneous increase in caseload, which one might expect to increase
the likelihood of dismissal as a docket management tool. See Whytock, supra note _, at 20.
132
This proposition is consistent with liberal international relations theory, upon which Slaughter’s liberal theory of
international law is based. See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics, 51 Int’l Org. 513 (1997).
133
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
128
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deference owed to foreign plaintiffs is lower, and justified this proposition as a tool for
discouraging forum shopping.134 For his part, Justice Scalia has expressed doubt that the forum
non conveniens doctrine can affect plaintiffs’ choice of forum at all given its discretionary
nature.135 However, with a dismissal rate of nearly 50 percent, forum non conveniens in action
sends a clear signal that dismissal is very likely indeed, a signal that might be more likely than
the ambiguous doctrinal signal to affect choice of forum by transnational actors.136
Domestic and Foreign Parties in Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and Practice. The
rule-of-law value of impartiality implies both that U.S. district courts should accord equal
treatment to domestic and foreign parties, and that they should base their decisions on recognized
legal doctrine. In the forum non conveniens context, this creates a paradox, because the doctrine
itself favors domestic parties. In Piper Aircraft v. Reyno (1981), the Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs who are “[c]itizens or residents deserve somewhat more deference than foreign
plaintiffs” with respect to their choice of forum.137 With an estimated rate of dismissal when the
plaintiffs are foreign that is twice as high as when there is at least one domestic plaintiff (see
Table 2 below), one might suspect that forum non conveniens in action goes beyond giving
domestic plaintiffs merely “somewhat more” deference.138
However, there appears to be no such disparate treatment of domestic and foreign
defendants.139 The evidence therefore does not suggest a general bias in favor of U.S. parties.
Rather, impartiality between domestic and foreign parties only appears to fail when partiality is
required by the forum non conveniens doctrine itself. One way to resolve the rule of law
paradox conceptually might be to distinguish internal and external rule of law perspectives on
transnational judicial governance. From an internal perspective, the fact of (if not the full extent
of) domestic party bias in forum non conveniens decisionmaking is consistent with the impartial
application of recognized domestic legal doctrine. From an external perspective, the outcome is
discrimination against foreign parties, which is not an outcome that is necessarily consistent with
foreign and international sources of transnational law, and thus not easily reconciled with the
value of impartiality.
134

Reyno, 454 U.S. at 256 and 251-252. This signal is highly ambiguous in and of itself. As Martin Davies []
argues, the court’s holding that “[c]itizens or residents deserve somewhat more deference than foreign plaintiffs”
begs the question of how much more weight.
135
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (“to tell the truth, forum non conveniens cannot
really be relied upon in making decisions about secondary conduct—in deciding, for example, where to sue or where
one is subject to being sued”).
136
That said, neither forum non conveniens doctrine nor forum non conveniens in action necessarily gives
transnational actors much certainty about the circumstances in which suits are likely to be dismissed, which is
problematic from the perspective of the rule-of-law value of predictability. This is a question I will return to below.
137
454 U.S. at 256.
138
The presence of a domestic plaintiff reduces the probability of dismissal by 20 percent, even after controlling for
other factors. Whytock, supra note _, at 23. There is 95 percent certainty that the actual reduction is between 9 and
36 percent.
139
The 95% confidence intervals for rate of dismissal when there is a domestic defendant and when defendants are
all foreign overlap substantially ([40.7, 60.3] and [35.6, 53.9], respectively), and a Pearson chi-squared test of
independence indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no association between dismissal and
the presence of a domestic defendant (p=.391). See also Whytock, supra note _, at 21 (finding that the nationality of
the defendant does not have a statistically significant effect on forum non conveniens decisionmaking in U.S. district
courts).
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Table 2: Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal Rates for Domestic and Foreign Plaintiffs
Number of
Decisions
101

Estimated Dismissal
Rate (%)
31.1

95% Confidence
Interval
[23.1, 40.5]

Foreign Plaintiff

106

63.4

[53.6, 72.1]

Total

207

46.9

[40.2, 53.7]

Domestic Plaintiff

Notes: There is 95% certainty that the actual dismissal rate in the overall population of published U.S. district court
forum non conveniens decisions is between the two values indicated in the “95% Confidence Interval” column.
Agresti-Coull 95% confidence interval reported. Domestic Plaintiff means at least one plaintiff is foreign. Foreign
Plaintiff means all plaintiffs are foreign. A Pearson chi-squared test of independence indicates that we can reject
with more than 99% confidence the null hypothesis that there is no association between dismissal and the presence
of a domestic plaintiff (p=.000).

Some critics have posited that there is a more targeted form of domestic party bias in
forum non conveniens decisionmaking that is not warranted by doctrine, namely a bias in favor
of U.S. corporate defendants that protects them from liability for harm caused by their foreign
activity to foreign individuals.140 There are, in fact, a priori theoretical grounds to expect judicial
decisionmaking outcomes in transnational litigation to favor corporate parties, based on the
seminal work of law and society scholar Marc Galanter on why repeat players in litigation tend
to be more successful than other parties in the U.S. legal system.141 The evidence does not
support this conclusion: there is not a statistically significant association between a foreign
individual suing a U.S. business for an injury to that individual outside the United States on the
one hand, and forum non conveniens dismissal on the other hand.142 Nor does there appear to be
a more general bias in favor of business plaintiffs or business defendants.143

140

See, e.g., Paul, supra note _, at 170 (concluding, after discussion of the Bhopal litigation, that “the application of
forum non conveniens insulates United States companies manufacturing abroad from strict United States regulatory
standards”). [others]
141
According to Galanter, repeat players in litigation, particularly those with greater access to experienced lawyers
and other litigation resources, are likely to be more successful in litigation than others. Marc Galanter, Why the
“Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y. Rev. 95 (1974). In
transnational litigation, businesses are more likely than individuals to be just this type of repeat player.
142
The 95% confidence intervals for dismissal when there is not and when there is foreign individual suing a U.S.
business for an injury to that individual outside the United States overlap substantially ([38.6, 52.6] and [40.9, 81.0],
respectively), and a Pearson chi-squared test of independence indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
there is no association between dismissal and this particular configuration of litigation (p=.143).
143
The 95% confidence intervals for dismissal when there is not and when there is a business plaintiff overlap
substantially ([37.2, 55.7] and [38.6, 57.6], respectively), and a Pearson chi-squared test of independence indicates
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no association between dismissal and the presence of a
business plaintiff (p=.800). Likewise, the 95% confidence intervals for dismissal when there is not and when there
is a business defendant overlap substantially ([25.6, 63.2] and [40.6, 54.7], respectively), and a Pearson chi-squared
test of independence indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no association between dismissal
and the presence of a business defendant (p=.709).
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Adequacy of Foreign Courts in Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals. To the extent that
the forum non conveniens doctrine results in the dismissal of cases in favor of foreign courts that
do not operate on the basis of the rule of law, this would be bad news for transnational rule of
law. After all, even if the decision to defer to a foreign court is predictable and impartial, if the
result is that a plaintiff is faced with the prospect of litigating in a legal system that is either
unpredictable or partial, the result cannot be said to square with rule of law values.
Unfortunately, the forum non conveniens doctrine does little to protect defendants against such
dismissals.144 In Piper v. Reyno, the Supreme Court noted that “[a]t the outset of any forum non
conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum,” but
added that “[o]rdinarily, this requirement will be satisfied when the defendant is ‘amendable to
process’ in the other jurisdiction.”145 Only in “rare circumstances . . . where the remedy offered
by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate alternative,
and the initial requirement may not be satisfied. Thus, for example, dismissal would not be
appropriate where the alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the
dispute.”146
In practice, however, it appears that forum non conveniens dismissals are rarely made in
favor of foreign states that have worse-than-average rule of law ratings. Table 3 below presents
two different measures of domestic rule of law for the foreign states to which U.S. district courts
in my sample considered deferring: the “Rule of Law” indicator from the World Bank’s
Governance Indicators, and the “Civil Liberties” rating from the Freedom House Freedom in the
World report, which includes a rule-of-law component.147 As Table 3 below indicates, the
average rule of law rating for foreign states to which U.S. district courts defer in forum non
conveniens decisions is substantially better than the world average.148 It also is higher than the
average for courts to which U.S. district courts decided not to defer.149

144

Based on evidence suggesting that most cases dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds are not continued in a
foreign court at all [cites to Robertson, etc.], one might argue that this issue is moot. On the other hand, it is
conceivable that dismissals in favor of non-rule-of-law courts may in fact be one reason why such cases are not
continued. Moreover, it is probable that such dismissals may enhance the bargaining position of defendants to an
even greater extent than dismissals to well functioning legal systems that operate in accordance with core rule-oflaw values.
145
Piper, 454 U.S. at 255.
146
Id.
147
Because the Freedom House rating includes components other than the rule of law, it is a less precise measure.
148
The average for courts to which forum non conveniens dismissals are made (1.03 using the World Bank indicator
and 2.10 using the Freedom House rating) falls within the best 25 percent of countries worldwide (squarely so using
the World Bank indicator, and approximately so using the Freedom House rating).
149
This difference is not, however, statistically significant at conventional levels. Moreover, it is important to
remember that the averages do not mean that U.S. district courts never dismiss in favor of foreign courts with worse
than average rule-of-law ratings, as indicated by the ranges in the value of those ratings for dismissals.
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Table 3: Rule of Law Ratings of Foreign States to Which U.S. District Courts Defer in
Forum Non Conveniens Decisions

Mean (Dismissed)

World Bank
Rule of Law Indicator
(Higher is Better)
1.03

Freedom House
Civil Liberties Rating
(Lower is Better)
2.10

Range (Dismissed)

-.99 to 2.07

1 to 6

Mean (Not Dismissed)

.92

2.40

Range (Not Dismissed)

-1.46 to 2.14

1 to 7

Mean (Overall Sample)

.97

2.26

Range (Overall Sample)

-1.46 to 2.14

1 to 7

Mean (World in 2000)

-.09

3.5

Range (World in 2000)

-2.11 to 2.37

1 to 7

-.80 to .54

2 to 5

188 countries

192 countries

25th to 75th Percentile (World in 2000)
Number of Observations

Notes: (1) The World Bank Rule of Law Indicator is designed to measure “the extent to which agents have
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.” Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi,
Governance Matters V: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-2005 4 (Sept. 2006) (available
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance). (2) Freedom House explains its Civil Liberties Rating as follows:
“Countries and territories that receive a rating of 1 come closest to ensuring the freedoms expressed in the civil
liberties checklist, including freedom of expression, assembly, association, education, and religion. They are
distinguished by an established and generally equitable system of rule of law. Countries and territories with this
rating enjoy free economic activity and tend to strive for equality of opportunity.” Freedom House, Freedom in the
World: Methodology (2006) (available at http://www.freedomhouse.org). The general rule of law items on the civil
liberties checklist include the following: (a) “Is there an independent judiciary?” (b) “Does the rule of law prevail in
civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?” (c) “Is there protection from political terror,
unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom
from war and insurgencies?” and (d) “Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various
segments of the population?” Id.

However, neither the forum non conveniens doctrine nor U.S. district court
decisionmaking necessarily should be credited for this relatively positive state of affairs. A
comparison of the mean rule of law ratings for the overall sample of forum non conveniens
decisions and for the world indicates that the former is substantially better than the latter. This
suggests that non-rule-of-law countries are for the most part being selected out through a case-
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selection process rather than through the forum non conveniens decisionmaking process.150
Although the data allows little more than speculation about the reason for this, one explanation,
based on earlier interpretations of liberal international law theory, might be that there is indeed a
distinct “liberal zone of law”—a “zone of liberal states in which the laws governing transnational
disputes are domestic laws applied by domestic courts guided by pluralist principles”—whereas
transnational disputes involving liberal and nonliberal states are more likely to be resolved
through political processes.151 If this is correct, then the scope of transnational judicial
governance, and the ability of domestic law and domestic courts to foster transnational rule of
law, may be limited to transnational relations among liberal democracies or, more specifically, to
states that have relatively well-functioning domestic rule of law systems.
Better-than-average rule of law in the foreign state may be desirable, but it is not
sufficient for transnational rule of law. Another important indicator of the extent to which
domestic courts foster the transnational rule of law is how seriously they engage in analysis of
the proposed foreign court. The evidence is not encouraging. In Reyno, the Supreme Court
identified two aspects of this analysis: availability and adequacy.152 To be available, the
defendant must be amenable to process in the foreign court, and to be adequate the remedy
offered by the foreign court must not be “clearly unsatisfactory.”153 However, in an estimated 19
percent of forum non conveniens dismissals, the court engaged in no alternative forum
analysis.154 One way to increase the likelihood that the defendant will be amenable to process
and that the proposed foreign court will indeed be available is to condition the forum non
conveniens dismissal on the defendant’s waiver of jurisdictional defenses.155 But U.S. district
courts impose such conditions only in an estimated 42 percent of forum non conveniens
dismissals.156 And to determine whether or not the legal remedy offered in the foreign court is
“clearly unsatisfactory,” the U.S. district court must engage in at least a minimal choice of law
analysis to determine whether the foreign court would apply U.S. law and, if not, a comparative
analysis to determine whether the law that the foreign court will apply offers a satisfactory
150

In fact, plaintiffs rarely challenge the capacity or the integrity of foreign courts in the forum non conveniens
context. In only 13 of the 210 cases in my random sample (6 percent) did plaintiffs challenge on the ground of
capacity (and in only 3 of these did the court agree), and in only 17 of the 210 cases in my random sample (8
percent) did plaintiffs challenge on the ground of integrity (and in only 4 of these cases did the court agree).
151
Anne-Marie Burley, Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92
Colum. L. Rev. 1907, 1917-1921 (1992). See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law,
94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 240, 249 (“I do subscribe to a distinction between liberal and non-liberal states as a
positive indicator of how states are likely to behave in a variety of circumstances, including within or toward
international institutions”). For a critique of this claim, see José E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A
Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12 Eur. J. Int’l L. 183 (2001). Another possibility is that transnational actors
based in non-rule of law countries are less likely to prefer litigation as a form of dispute resolution, due to
disillusionment from their home country experience.
152
Piper, 454 U.S. at 255.
153
Id.
154
There is 95 percent certainty that the actual percentage in the overall population of published forum non
conveniens dismissals is between 12.6 and 28.1. In many of these cases, however, the lack of analysis may be due
to a lack of objection to the proposed foreign court on the part of the plaintiff.
155
Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 310, 317-319
(2002). Occasionally, other conditions are added as well, including willingness of the foreign court to hear the case.
Id. at 317.
156
There is 95 percent certainty that the actual percentage in the overall population of published forum non
conveniens dismissals is between 33.5 and 52.3.
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remedy.157 Yet I estimate that U.S. district courts engage in choice of law analysis in only 10
percent,158 and comparative law analysis in only 18 percent,159 of forum non conveniens
dismissals. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how U.S. district court judges—not
to mention plaintiffs—can have very much confidence in these adequacy determinations. United
States district courts could more effectively foster transnational rule of law by performing the
alternative forum analysis mandated by the Supreme Court in a more rigorous manner.160
Rule of Law Determinants? The Law and Politics of Forum Non Conveniens Decisionmaking
We now have a basic understanding of how domestic courts behave as global governors
in the forum non conveniens context. Using basic statistical techniques of descriptive inference,
we have explored some of the global governance implications of forum non conveniens in
action, normatively evaluating them against the rule of law values of predictability and
impartiality. But what can we learn about the causes of these decisions? Why do domestic
courts govern the way they do? More precisely, what factors influence the fundamental
transnational judicial governance decision between the assertion of domestic authority and
deference to foreign authority to govern transnational activity? And are these factors
predominantly political or legal in character? In this section, I will summarize work that I have
done elsewhere in an effort to shed light on these questions.161 The focal points of my discussion
will be seven hypotheses about political and rule-of-law determinants of judicial allocation of
governance authority over transnational activity, derived from theories of judicial
decisionmaking and international relations, and Table 4 below, which presents the results of a
statistical test of the hypotheses using the forum non conveniens dataset described above.162 The
resulting causal inferences will provide another empirical basis for normatively evaluating
transnational judicial governance, and allow us to further explore the extent to which domestic
law and domestic courts effectively foster transnational rule of law.

157

It is hard to see how the adequacy analysis could be conclusive, or even suggestive, absent the choice of law
analysis and, depending on the outcome of that analysis, a comparative law analysis. See Davies, supra note _, at
320-321 (agreeing that the Supreme Court’s statement of the forum non conveniens doctrine in Gilbert and Reyno
logically requires choice of law analysis, while noting that this requirement goes against one of the motivations of
the doctrine, which is to reduce the administrative burden placed on U.S. district courts).
158
There is 95 percent certainty that the actual percentage in the overall population of published forum non
conveniens dismissals is between 5.4 and 17.8.
159
There is 95 percent certainty that the actual percentage in the overall population of published forum non
conveniens dismissals is between 11.7 and 27.0.
160
Given how busy district court judges are, this simply might not be practicable. See infra, notes _-_, and
accompanying text. In any event, this would only be a first step. I would argue that the doctrinal guidelines for
adequate alternative forum analysis are themselves in need of improvement to give plaintiffs whose suits are
dismissed in favor of a foreign court protections vis-à-vis that court that are equivalent to the protections that U.S.
personal jurisdiction doctrine gives defendants vis-à-vis U.S. courts.
161
Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial Governance: The Case of Forum
Non Conveniens (Feb. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=969033) [hereinafter
Transnational Judicial Governance].
162
This section provides only a brief overview of the hypotheses, methods, and findings. Readers interested in more
information on the theoretical bases for these hypotheses and about the data and research design are urged to consult
Whytock, Transnational Judicial Governance, supra note _.
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Political Factors Influencing Transnational Judicial Governance. The first five
hypotheses suggest that transnational judicial governance is influenced by political factors:
• Attitudinal Model Hypothesis (H1): A Republican judge is less likely to grant a forum
non conveniens motion (thus deferring to foreign adjudicative authority) than a
Democratic judge. According to the leading theory of judicial decisionmaking, the
“attitudinal model,” court decisions are based on judges’ personal policy
preferences,163 often measured in terms of partisan affiliation, with Republican
indicating conservative attitudes and Democratic indicating liberal attitudes.164 In
other words, “Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., decided cases as he did because he was
liberal; Justice William Rehnquist or Warren Burger, because they were
conservative.”165 Survey data suggests that, on average, Republicans more strongly
and unconditionally favor assertion of domestic authority over transnational activity
than Democrats.166 It is therefore plausible that Republican judges are less likely to
defer to foreign governance authority (including deference to foreign adjudicative
authority on forum non conveniens grounds) than Democratic judges.167
• Strategic Model Hypothesis (H2): A judge is less likely to grant a forum non
conveniens motion in a Republican political environment than a Democratic political
environment. Another leading theory of judicial decisionmaking, the “strategic
model,” shares the attitudinal model’s basic assumption that judges are policy seekers,
but emphasizes the constraints that they face. To maximize their preferences, justices
must act strategically; that is, they must consider not only their own preferences, but
also the preferences and actions of other political actors such as Congress and the
president, who have a “vast array of powers over matters important to the Court.”168
163

(Rohde and Spaeth 1976; Spaeth 1995; Segal and Spaeth 2002)
The use of party affiliation as a measure for a judge’s ideology follows George and Epstein (1992, 328) and
George (1998, 1651-1652). To create the variable, I began by using the political party of the nominating president
as a proxy for the judge’s political party, again following George and Epstein (1992, 328) and George (1998, 16511652), using data from the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of Federal Judges available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj. I then made corrections when Martinek’s (2005) Lower Federal Court
Confirmation Database contained data on a judge’s personal partisan identification that was different from that of
the nominating president, which was the case for 18 observations in my dataset.
165
(Spaeth 1995, 305)
166
Of most direct relevance, Republicans overall were more likely than Democrats to agree that the United States
should follow its own national interests even when its allies strongly disagree, and less likely than Democrats to
agree that U.S. foreign policy should take into account the interests and views of allies Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press (2005a, 21), which is consistent with the assumption that conservatives are less likely to defer
to foreign governance authority. However, only the most ideologically driven groups within each party expressed
views that differ significantly from the national average (2005a, 21). The partisan divide was more pronounced on
other matters that may have a bearing on the likelihood of deference to foreign governance authority. For example,
Republicans were less likely than Democrats to agree that “[t]he U.S. should mind its own business internationally
and let other countries get along the best they can on their own” (2005b, 42). In addition, Republicans were less
likely than Democrats to have confidence in diplomacy (2005a, 21) and less likely than Democrats to agree that the
U.S. “should cooperate fully with the United Nations” (2005b, 42)—attitudes which seem consistent with less
willingness on the part of Republicans to defer to foreign governance authority.
167
Alternatively, one might hypothesize that Democrats are more pro-plaintiff than Republicans, leading Democrats
to grant forum non conveniens motions less frequently.
168
(Epstein and Knight 1998, 12; George and Epstein 1992, 325). For example, Congress can propose constitutional
amendments or pass legislation overriding court decisions. It also can use judicial salaries, impeachment, or
legislative limits on jurisdiction to “punish” justices for their decisions—and although this rarely occurs, the
possibility of such measures gives justices an incentive to consider the policy preferences of the other branches
164
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Thus, the strategic model suggests that Congress and the president affect judicial
decisionmaking and that “the direction of their influence reflects their partisan
composition.”169 The implication is that U.S. district court judges should be less likely
to defer to foreign governance authority (including deference to foreign adjudicative
authority on forum non conveniens grounds) when the political environment is
Republican than when it is Democratic.170
• Realist Theory Hypothesis (H3): The greater the power of the state in which the
alternative foreign court is located, the more likely a judge is to grant a forum non
conveniens motion. Realist theories of international relations reinforce the attitudinal
and strategic models’ emphasis on the political determinants of transnational judicial
governance, but with a focus on power rather than ideology.171 Because realist theory
generally treats states as unitary actors, it is not clear from a realist perspective how
national power should affect judicial decisionmaking. As a general matter, however,
one might expect the likelihood of deference by one political actor to another
(including deference to foreign adjudicative authority on forum non conveniens
grounds) to be greater when the second is more powerful than the first.172
• Domestic Bias Hypothesis (H4): A judge is more likely to grant a forum non
conveniens motion if there is a domestic defendant and less likely to do so if there is a
domestic plaintiff. Nationality is another political factor that may influence
transnational judicial governance: domestic courts may be biased in favor of their own
nationals.173 Because a forum non conveniens motion is an attempt by the defendant
to thwart the plaintiff’s choice of forum, one would expect the presence of a U.S.

(Epstein and Knight 1998, 141-143). In addition, “government actors can refuse, implicitly or explicitly, to
implement particular constitutional decisions, thereby decreasing the Court’s ability to create efficacious policy”
(Epstein and Knight 1998, 144).
169
(George and Epstein 1992, 325).
170
I coded the political environment as Republican if the president and at least one house of Congress were
Republican, and as not Republican if the president was Democratic or both houses of Congress were Democratic.
This approach is based on George and Epstein’s (1992, 328) method of measuring the political environment,
although I use a dummy variable rather than their three-level measure to ensure adequate cell size for the logit
analysis. For simplification and to account for lame-duck status, I did not account for January when coding
presidential transition years. For the Senate, I coded 2001 and 2002 as Democratic, because Democrats were in the
majority for 8 of 12 months in 2001 and 11 of 12 months in 2002.
171
See Morgenthau (1978, 5) (“statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power”); Waltz (1979, 97-98)
(the distribution of power among states is a fundamental structural variable affecting state behavior); and
Mearsheimer (2001, 2) (“[t]he overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power”).
172
As Alter (2001, 40) notes, some scholars of European integration argue that the national interest is the primary
determinant of judicial decisionmaking. If this is true, then to the extent power defines national interests, it also
should influence the decisions of courts. For the realist theory hypothesis (H3), I used the foreign state’s annual
gross domestic product (“Foreign State’s GDP”) and its total annual military spending (“Foreign State’s Military
Spending”). This approach follows Guzman and Simmons (2005). I use data for the year 2000 and apply a natural
logarithmic transformation to improve symmetry. The data source is the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators, available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/. I only report results using Foreign State’s GDP
because Foreign State’s Military Spending was not statistically significant in any of my tests, and it has more
missing data than Foreign State’s GDP.
173
(Bhattacharya, Galpin and Haslem 2006; Moore 2003). However, empirical support for this proposition is
mixed. While Bhattacharya, Galpin and Haslem (2006) and Moore (2003) find that pro-American bias exists,
Clermont and Eisenberg (1996 and 2006) conclude that foreign parties actually fare better than their U.S.
counterparts in U.S. federal courts.
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plaintiff to decrease the likelihood of dismissal and the presence of a U.S. defendant to
increase the likelihood of dismissal.
• Liberal Theory Hypothesis (H5): A judge in a liberal democracy is more likely to
grant a forum non conveniens motion when the state in which the alternative foreign
court is located also is a liberal democracy. Beyond ideology, power and nationality,
a fifth potential political factor is regime type. Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that there
is an emerging global community of courts operating according to principles of
“judicial comity,” including the principle that “courts in different nations are entitled
to their fair share of disputes—both as coequals in the global task of judging and as
the instruments of a strong ‘local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home.’”174 In earlier versions of her liberal theory of international law, however, she
characterized this community of judges not as truly global, but rather as a more limited
“zone of law” populated by liberal states.175 In other words, “the courts of liberal
states handle cases involving other liberal states differently from the way they handle
cases involving nonliberal states.”176 This implies that domestic courts in liberal
democracies may be more likely to defer to the governance authority of a foreign state
(including deference to foreign adjudicative authority on forum non conveniens
grounds) when that foreign state also is a liberal democracy.177
Rule of Law Factors Influencing Transnational Judicial Governance. An alternative
conception is that transnational judicial governance is characterized not primarily by politics, but
by the rule of law, as the following hypotheses suggest:
• Legal Model Hypothesis (H6): A judge is more likely grant a forum non conveniens
motion when there is not a U.S. plaintiff than when there is, but the nationality of the
defendant should not matter. According to the legal model of judicial
decisionmaking, court decisions are based on the application of legal doctrine to the

174

Slaughter, New World Order, supra note _, at 87 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509).
Anne-Marie Burley, Law among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92
Colum. L. Rev. 1907, 1917 (1992).
176
(Burley 1992, 1917). She specifically suggests that these differences should be apparent in forum non conveniens
decisionmaking (Slaughter Burley 1993, 232), which is the doctrine I explore in the empirical section of this paper.
177
(Burley 1992, 1923) Alvarez (2001, 214-220) disagrees with Slaughter’s theory, questioning the tenability of the
liberal-illiberal distinction and arguing that the theory simply is not descriptively accurate: the courts of liberal
democracies are not necessarily more deferential to the courts of other liberal democracies. To test the liberal theory
hypothesis (H5), I used the variable “Liberal Democracy,” which indicates whether the foreign state was rated
“Free” by the Freedom House Freedom in the World Survey for the year prior to the court’s decision (0 if no, 1 if
yes). Although these ratings generally are stable over time during the period covered by my dataset, I use a one-year
lag on the theory that a boundedly rational judge is unlikely to become immediately aware of even substantial
changes in a foreign state’s politics. For purposes of her theory, Slaughter defines “liberal” states as those “with
juridical equality, constitutional protections of individual rights, representative republican governments, and market
economies based on private property rights” (Burley 1992, 1909). The Freedom House rankings capture these
characteristics quite nicely, by explicitly accounting for equal treatment under the law, protection of individual
rights (including freedoms of assembly, open public discussion, and defendants’ rights), representative government
(including election of representatives through free and fair elections and other political rights), and private property
rights (Freedom House 2006). The other leading measure of democracy, Polity IV, captures the concept of
representative government well, but only indirectly captures the other elements of Slaughter’s definition. Therefore,
for testing Slaughter’s liberal theory of international law, the Freedom House measure is more appropriate.
175
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facts of the case.178 Unlike the attitudinal and strategic models, which treat judges as
policy maximizers, the legal model may be understood as treating judges as “law
maximizers”: decisions are made by applying legal rules to the specific facts of the
case in order to reach the outcome that is most consistent with the applicable doctrine
of law.179 Unfortunately, it is difficult to derive from the legal model a testable
hypothesis about the impact of the forum non conveniens doctrine. While the doctrine
identifies general factors for district courts to consider—including the availability and
adequacy of the proposed foreign court and a variety of private and public interest
factors—it does not explicitly identify the specific facts to used by the court in
balancing these factors.180 However, one element of forum non conveniens analysis
that provides a basis for deriving a statistical test of the legal model hypothesis is the
nationality of the plaintiff. As the Supreme Court stated in Piper v. Reyno (1981), “a
foreign plaintiff’s choice [of a U.S. forum] deserves less deference” than that of a
domestic plaintiff’s choice.181 Thus, the citizenship of the plaintiff is a specific
doctrinally-relevant fact which should, according to the legal model, influence the
choice between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority in the forum non
conveniens context. However, if there is a general bias in favor of U.S. parties that
goes beyond that permitted by doctrine, as implied by the domestic bias hypothesis
(H4), then both the plaintiff’s and defendant’s nationality should have an effect.
• Territorial Heuristic Hypothesis (H7): A judge is more likely to grant a forum non
conveniens motion when the activity giving rise to the litigation occurred mostly or
entirely outside U.S. territory. Finally, because U.S. district court judges face a
daunting combination of limited decisionmaking resources and high decisionmaking
demands,182 they may not be able to engage in the type of decisionmaking process
178

As characterized by George and Epstein, the legal model posits that “legal doctrine, generated by past cases, is
the primary determinant of extant case outcomes” (1992, 324), and, as described by Segal, Songer and Cameron, it
holds that judges make decisions based on “the facts of the case in light of [the legal] text, intent, and precedent”
(1995, 235).
179
For example, Segal (1984) develops a legal model of U.S. Supreme Court decisionmaking in Fourth Amendment
search and seizure cases by surveying the Court’s search and seizure doctrine to identify a number of specific facts
(such as whether the search was of the defendant’s home, business, car or person) and subsidiary legal conclusions
(such as whether there was probable cause for the search and whether the search was incident to a lawful arrest) that
the doctrine identifies as relevant to a determination of whether a search or seizure is reasonable. Legal realists
famously criticized this interpretation of judicial decisionmaking as “mechanical jurisprudence.” [cites] However,
as Segal clarifies, this type of legal model should not be expected to determine court decisions; but the identified
factors “should strongly predispose the Court toward finding the search reasonable or unreasonable” (1984, 893)
and, in his empirical tests, the model was able to predict accurately a substantial proportion of the Court’s decisions.
George and Epstein (1992) used the same approach to develop and empirically test a legal model of Supreme Court
decisionmaking in death penalty cases.
180
See Davies, supra note _, at 316-364 (comprehensively surveying the elements of the forum non conveniens
doctrine, noting the doctrine’s failure to give courts factual guidance), David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens: “An Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion,” 29 Tex. Int’l L. J. 353 (1994) (title speaks
for itself), and Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. Penn.
L. Rev. 781 (1985) (criticizing the high degree of discretion that the doctrine vests in district courts). For a more in
depth discussion of the difficulty of deriving a legal model for the forum non conveniens doctrine, see Whytock,
Transnational Judicial Governance, supra note _, Appendix B.
181
454 U.S. 235, 266.
182
The workload of courts is heavy for all levels of the federal judiciary (Carp, Stidham, and Manning 2004, 52);
but unlike the Supreme Court, district courts are unable to control their caseload. Since 1995 there have been
approximately 400 to 500 pending cases per judge in the U.S. district courts each year. The data is from the Federal
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implied by the legal model, including thorough analysis of legally relevant facts and
systematic application of complex legal principles to those facts. Forum non
conveniens decisionmaking is likely to be particularly problematic in this respect,
given that the doctrine calls on judges to consider “all [of the] relevant public and
private interest factors” set forth in the Supreme Court’s precedents,183 and the lack of
specific guidance it offers on how to evaluate those factors.184 Rather, judges may
behave more like boundedly rational actors,185 basing their decisions largely on
decisionmaking shortcuts or “heuristics” that allow them to conserve decisionmaking
resources while keeping error costs to a minimum.186 One likely heuristic is
territoriality: the extent to which the transnational activity giving rise to the litigation
occurred outside U.S. territory. This heuristic attribute reduces decisionmaking costs,
because it is easier to evaluate than the elements enumerated by the Supreme Court in
its forum non conveniens precedents. Yet it is not likely to entail excessive error
costs, because territoriality is likely to be correlated with some of these elements—
such as ease of access to evidence and whether the controversy is considered
Court Management Statistics published by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html.Because judicial appointments have not kept pace with growing
dockets, “federal judges, at both the trial and circuit court levels, are under severe resource and expertise
constraints”; they face “an overwhelming caseload and limited time and resources with which to decide those cases”
(Bainbridge and Gulati 2002, 86, 102). As a result, “a significant portion of [lower court] decision making must be
done on the spur of the moment, without the luxury of lengthy reflection or discussion with staff or colleagues”
(Carp, Stidham, and Manning 2004, 282).
183
Reyno, 454 U.S. at 257. See also Davies, supra note _, at 351 (“[t]he Reyno court implied that all public and
private factors should be considered in all cases”).
184
Whytock, Transnational Judicial Governance, supra note _, at 16-17 and Appendix B.
185
The neoclassical concept of rationality assumes that individuals maximize their utility by making the choice that
yields the greatest expected utility, discounted by costs, based on a comprehensive analysis of available
information—which, in the case of uncertainty or incomplete information, includes the estimation of a probability
distribution associated with outcomes (Jones 1999, 299). In contrast, following Bainbridge and Gulati (2002) and
Segal (1986), I assume that judges are boundedly rational decision makers: that is, they are goal-oriented, but due to
their cognitive limitations—particularly their limited ability to gather and process information—they are unable to
maximize in the neoclassical sense. Because boundedly rational actors cannot maximize, they satisfice: that is, the
decisionmaking process is “usually terminated with the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal, courses of action”
(Simon 1985, 295). Thus, whereas the legal model treats judges as law maximizers, the heuristics model
understands them as “law satisficers.”
186
In the language of cognitive psychology, heuristics involve a process of “attribute substitution”: “whenever the
aspect of the judgmental object that one intends to judge (the target attribute) is less readily assessed than a related
property that yields a plausible answer (the heuristic attribute),” individuals may substitute the former with the latter
(Kahneman and Frederick 2005, 269). The relative accessibility of heuristics—in terms of lower information
gathering or information processing demands—reduces decisionmaking costs, thus helping decision makers
conserve decisionmaking resources. Bainbridge and Gulati (2002), Guthrie, Rachlinksi, and Wistrich (2001) and
Segal (1986) have all found that judicial decisionmaking relies heavily on heuristics “to cut down on comprehensive
decision making” (Segal 1986, 941), and this makes sense, especially at the district court level where, as discussed
above, judges face a particularly acute combination of high decisionmaking demands and limited decisionmaking
capacity. When an applicable legal doctrine specifies the factors for making a particular type of legal decision,
these factors can be understood as the relevant target attributes. From this perspective, bounded rationality suggests
that if assessing the doctrinally-specified target attributes requires too much information gathering or cognitive
effort, judges will replace them with heuristic attributes that are conceptually related and provide plausible answers,
but entail lower decision costs. In plain English, “difficult questions are often answered by substituting an answer
to an easier one” (Kahneman and Frederick 2005, 269). More precisely for this study, judges may replace answers
to difficult legal questions with answers to related but relatively simple questions.
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“local.”187 It is important to emphasize that the use of heuristics does not imply that
judges do not take the law seriously. To the contrary, in my conception judicial
heuristics are instruments that allow judges to do the best they can to abide by the
norm of good faith judging given the reality of high decisionmaking demands and
limited decisionmaking resources.188 For this reason, the use of the territoriality
heuristic in transnational judicial governance can help domestic courts foster
transnational rule of law—not the ideal-type “law maximizing” rule of law implied by
the legal model, but rather a more modest “law satisficing” rule of law.
Additional Factors. I control for two additional factors that may influence the choice
between domestic and foreign governance authority in the forum non conveniens context. First,
U.S. federal district judges may be less inclined to dismiss cases involving issues that they
perceive as particularly salient, such as issues involving federal statutes.189 Second, caseload
may have an influence on lower court judicial decisionmaking. In the case of forum non
conveniens decisionmaking, the implication would be that busier U.S. district courts are more
likely to dismiss litigation in favor of a foreign court because this allows them to reduce their
caseload.190 In fact, by including “[a]dministrative difficulties” resulting from congestion in its
list of public interest factors, the Supreme Court in Gilbert v. Gulf Oil (1947) can even be
understood as acknowledging that the forum non conveniens doctrine may be used as a caseload
management tool.

187

For a detailed explanation of the reasoning that motivates this hypothesis, see Whytock, Transnational Judicial
Governance, supra note _, at 10-13. The main variable that I used to test the heuristics model hypothesis (H7)
indicates whether the place of the activity giving rise to the transnational litigation was all or mostly outside U.S.
territory (0 if no, 1 if yes). I coded the variable based on two factors, the place of the conduct of the defendant
complained of by the plaintiff, and the place of the plaintiff’s alleged injury, each as stated in the court’s opinion. I
coded the place variable as “yes” if both the place of conduct and the place of injury were entirely foreign, if the
place of conduct was entirely foreign and the place of injury mixed, or if the place of injury was entirely foreign and
the place of conduct mixed. When the place of conduct and place of injury were both mixed or all or mostly inside
U.S. territory, I coded the place variable as “no,” because under these circumstances the territoriality heuristic is not
expected to point toward dismissing the case in favor of a foreign court.
188
Thus, to Gillman’s description of the norm of good faith judging as “a sense of obligation to make the best
decision possible in light of one’s general training and sense of professional obligation” (2001, 486), I would add
“and in light of one’s highly limited decisionmaking resources.” See also Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4
Perspectives on Politics 261, 265-270 (2006) (discussing legal norms).
189
See (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004; Unah and Hancock 2006) (identifying case salience as a factor
influencing judicial decisionmaking). As Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek (2004, 130) argue in their study of
dissenting behavior by appellate court judges, “the more salient a case is, the more likely it is to have policy
consequences and, hence, the more likely it is to stimulate judges to devote the necessary effort to write a dissenting
opinion.” This reasoning implies that judges also should be less likely to grant motions to dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds in cases that raise particularly salient legal issues.
190
See (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004, 134) (noting, however, that the empirical evidence for this
proposition is mixed). To control for caseload effects, I used the variable “Caseload,” which measures the number
of cases filed in each district in the year prior to the court’s decision. I use the natural logarithm of the “weighted
filings per judgeship” figure from the Federal Judicial Center’s Federal Court Management Statistics, Judicial
Caseload Profiles, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html, in the year prior to the court’s decision.
I use a one-year lag on the theory that because of the duration of cases, the prior year’s filings are likely to be a more
accurate measure of the district’s current workload. I applied the logarithmic transformation to increase symmetry.
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Table 4. Logit Analysis: Factors Influencing Choice between Assertion of Domestic
Adjudicative Authority and Deference to Foreign Adjudicative Authority (Forum Non
Conveniens Motions)

Republican Judge (H1)

noyes

Estimated
Change in
Probability
(%)
-9.6

Republican Political Environment (H2)

noyes

-14.1

10.8

-32.9, 2.8

Domestic Plaintiff (H4, H6)

noyes

-20.5***

.1

-35.9, -9.2

Domestic Defendant (H4)

noyes

-10.8

23.3

-28.5, 5.4

Foreign State’s GDP (H3)

25th75th
percentile

1.2

81.1

-9.7, 12.0

Foreign State is Liberal Democracy
(H5)

noyes

32.2**

.2

10.3, 51.5

Locus of Activity All or Mostly
Extraterritorial (H7)

noyes

42.1***

<.1

25.1, 56.4

Federal Statute

noyes

-10.0

26.8

-27.7, 8.1

25th75th
percentile

.3

92.4

-9.3, 9.5

Independent Variable

Caseload

Change in
Independent
Variable

Type I Error
Rate (%)

95%
Confidence
Interval

14.6

-23.1, 3.0

N=191
Prob.>LR Chi-squared=0.000
Correctly Classified: 72.8%
Adjusted Count R2: .435
Area under ROC Curve: .8159
Notes: (1) I used the Clarify software program to simulate the change in the expected value of the dependent variable caused by
increasing each independent variable from 0 to 1 (in the case of dummy variables) and from the 25th to the 75th percentile (in the
case of continuous variables), setting each of the other variables at their mode (for dummy variables) or mean (for continuous
variables). Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg & Gary King, CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results
(2001). (2) *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. (3) The “correctly classified” figure indicates the proportion of outcomes that were
correctly classified by the model using a .5 probability cutoff to translate predicted probabilities into dichotomous predictions.
Lawrence C. Hamilton, Statistics with Stata 270-271 (2004). Thus, it indicates the proportion of outcomes for which the model
estimated at least a .5 probability of deference to foreign governance authority, and the court in fact deferred. (4) Adjusted count R2
is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly predicted simply by choosing the outcome with
the largest percentage of observed cases, using a .5 probability cutoff. J. Scott Long & Jeremy Freese, Regression Models for
Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata 111-112 (2d ed. 2006). (5) The ROC curve plots 1 minus the specificity (the false
positive rate) on the x-axis and sensitivity (the true positive rate) on the y-axis for each possible probability cutoff. The area under
the ROC curve is equal to the probability that a random decision granting a forum non conveniens motion has a higher value of the
dependent variable than a random decision denying a forum non conveniens motion. Douglas G. Altman & J. Martin Bland,
Receiver Operating Characteristic Plots, 188 Brit. Med. J. 188 (1994). The larger the area under the curve, the more discriminating
the model.
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Discussion of Results. The results in Table 4 above suggest that a combination of
political and legal factors influence the choice between assertion of domestic governance
authority and deference to foreign governance authority over transnational activity in the forum
non conveniens context. Regarding the hypothesized political factors, the results do not support
the attitudinal model hypothesis (H1), the strategic model hypothesis (H2), the domestic party
bias hypothesis (H3), or the realist theory hypothesis (H4). Except for Domestic Defendant,
which has a negative sign whereas the domestic party bias hypothesis suggests that it should
have a positive effect on the probability of forum non conveniens dismissal, the estimated effects
of the relevant variables have their expected signs (a negative effect for Republican Judge and
Republican Political Environment, and a positive effect for Foreign State’s GDP). However,
none of these effects are statistically significant at conventional levels. That is, there is more
than a 5 percent probability of what statisticians call “type I error”—the error of rejecting the
“null” hypothesis that there is no relationship between two variables when, in fact, the null
hypothesis is true and the apparent relationship is merely the result of chance. For some
variables, the likelihood of type I error is substantially higher.191
In contrast, the results do furnish support for the liberal theory hypothesis (H5): U.S.
district courts appear to be more likely to defer to foreign adjudicative authority when the foreign
state is a liberal democracy than when it is not. As Table 4 shows, the likelihood of a forum non
conveniens dismissal is an estimated 32.2 percent higher when the foreign state is a liberal
democracy than when it is not, with 95 percent certainty that the actual difference in the full
population of published U.S. district court forum non conveniens decisions is between 10.3 and
51.5 percent. The type I error rate indicates that the probability that the apparent relationship
between liberal democracy and deference to foreign adjudicative authority is due to chance is
very low (less than 1 percent).
Regarding the hypothesized rule-of-law factors, the results provide some support for the
legal model hypothesis (H6). The Supreme Court in Reyno made it clear that less deference
should be given to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. forum—but as Martin Davies asks in his
comprehensive review of the forum non conveniens doctrine: “Less than what?”192 Although the
doctrine does not provide the answer, forum non conveniens in action, according to the results,
shows that U.S. district court judges are an estimated 20.5 percent less likely to dismiss (thus
deferring to foreign adjudicative authority) when there is a domestic plaintiff than otherwise,
with a 95 percent certainty that the actual difference in the full population of published U.S.
district court forum non conveniens decisions is between -35.9 and -9.2 percent. The type I error
rate indicates that the probability that the apparent relationship between the plaintiff’s nationality
and deference to foreign adjudicative authority is due to chance is less than one-tenth of one
percent. As noted earlier in my discussion of descriptive inferences about dismissal rates with
domestic and foreign plaintiffs,193 from an internal rule of law perspective, the fact that the
191

As with any statistical tests, the results of my test do not “disprove” these hypotheses (or “prove” others).
Rather, insofar as these methods are probabilistic, they estimate the likelihood of particular relationships and the
degree of certainty one can have that the actual magnitude of a particular effect is within a certain range (for
example, the 95 percent confidence intervals indicate that there is 95 percent certainty that an actual effect is
between the two values listed). In short, statistical findings are evidence, not proof.
192
Davies, supra note _, at 313.
193
See supra, notes _-_, and accompanying text.
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plaintiff’s nationality has a causal effect (if not necessarily the full magnitude of this effect) is
consistent with the impartial application of the forum non conveniens doctrine as stated by the
Supreme Court. But from an external perspective, this effect clearly is not so easily reconciled
with the value of impartiality.
The most important effect appears to be territoriality. Consistent with the territoriality
heuristic hypothesis (H7), U.S. district court judges are an estimated 42.1 percent more likely to
defer to foreign adjudicative authority when the transnational activity giving rise to the litigation
occurred all or mostly outside U.S. territory, with a 95 percent certainty that the actual difference
in the full population is between 25.1 and 56.4 percent. Not only is this substantively a very
important effect; the probability of type I error is less than one-tenth of one percent. However, in
the study of judicial decisionmaking “a particular pattern of behavior usually is susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation.”194 This problem cannot be taken lightly in the study of
judicial heuristics. As discussed above, for a particular heuristic to be a plausible explanation for
judicial decisionmaking, it must tend not to result in decisions that clearly are legally erroneous,
which means that it must have some relationship to doctrinally-specified decisionmaking factors.
This creates a threat to inference, because a pattern of decisionmaking that appears driven by
such a heuristic may in fact partly reflect legal analysis of those factors rather than the use of
decisionmaking shortcuts.
To mitigate this threat and to discriminate more effectively between law and heuristics, I
conducted a qualitative analysis of each of the 210 judicial opinions in my dataset using the
method of structured, focused comparison.195 The comparison focuses on the judge’s legal
analysis of the forum non conveniens issue as set forth in the opinion, with the goal of evaluating
the extent to which the judge actually analyzed the factors specified in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
statements of the forum non conveniens doctrine. After Reyno, judges are to consider not only
“all [of the] relevant public and private interest factors,” but also the appropriate level of
deference owed to the plaintiff’s choice of forum and the availability and adequacy of the
proposed foreign court.196 Thus, an observable implication of the legal model is that most of
these factors will be analyzed, whereas an observable implication of the heuristics model is that
at least some of them will not.197 To structure the comparison, I divided the forum non
conveniens doctrine, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Gilbert and Reyno, into eleven distinct
elements, and systematically applied them by giving each case one point for each element of
doctrine analyzed in the opinion. 198

194

Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 Pol. Res. Q. 749, 762 (1994)
Alexander L. George & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences chap. 3
(2005).
196
Reyno, 454 U.S. at 257. See also Davies, supra note _, at 351 (“[t]he Reyno court implied that all public and
private factors should be considered in all cases”).
197
As Segal (1984, 894) and Spaeth (1995, 296) note, the presence of analysis in a judicial opinion does not
necessarily mean that it was an a priori basis for the judge’s decision rather than a post hoc justification for it. Thus,
there is some risk that my method overestimates the impact of legal analysis.
198
See Whytock, Transnational Judicial Governance, supra note _, at 25-26 and Appendix B for details on this
methodology. Legal analysis is the application of applicable legal principles to the facts in order to generate a legal
conclusion. Therefore, I gave points for combined statements of law and fact, but not for mere recitation of legal
principles or summary legal conclusions not explicitly based on some fact.
195
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Table 5. Elements of Forum Non Conveniens Analysis Included in Judges’ Opinions
Elements of Forum Non
Conveniens Analysis
Level of Deference

Points
Possible
1

Mean

Std. Error

.467

.034

95% Confidence
Interval
.400, .534

Alternative Forum

1

.552

.034

.485, .618

Private Interest Factors

4

2.152

.081

1.993, 2.311

Public Interest Factors

5

2.110

.108

1.900, 2.323

Total

11

5.281

.206

4.875, 5.687

Table 5 above presents the results of the qualitative analysis. Overall, U.S. district court
judges include in their opinions an average of only five of eleven elements of forum non
conveniens analysis. This represents an estimated average of 48 percent of the elements, with a
95 percent level of confidence that the actual average is between 44 and 52 percent. The result is
consistent across the four main parts of the forum non conveniens doctrine, with only 47 percent
of cases addressing the level of deference owed to the plaintiff’s choice of forum based on the
plaintiff’s citizenship, and only 55 percent including an analysis of the proposed alternative
forum.199 Similarly, judges analyzed an average of only 2.15 private interest elements out of
four and only 2.11 public interest elements out of five. This evidence is what the heuristics
model would predict, but it is difficult to reconcile with the legal model. Therefore, although the
statistical analysis above suggests that at least one legal factor—whether the plaintiff is
domestic—has an important influence on forum non conveniens decisionmaking, I tentatively
conclude that the heuristics model more accurately describes the causal mechanism that underlies
the choice between domestic and foreign adjudicative authority in forum non conveniens
decisionmaking. If this is correct, then to the extent U.S. district courts are fostering
transnational rule of law, it is not an ideal-type “law maximizing” rule of law as contemplated by
the legal model. Rather, it is a more modest “law satisficing” rule of law which, given the high
decisionmaking demands placed on U.S. district court judges, their limited decisionmaking
resources, and the nature of the forum non conveniens doctrine itself, may presently be all that
we can reasonably hope for.
Predictability. In his dissent in Gilbert, Justice Black strongly criticized the Supreme
Court’s endorsement of the forum non conveniens doctrine, arguing that “[t]he broad and
indefinite discretion left to federal courts to decide the question of convenience from the welter
of factors which are relevant to such a judgment will inevitably produce a complex of close and
indistinguishable decisions from which accurate prediction of the proper forum will become
difficult, if not impossible.”200 More recently, Justice Scalia argued that “[t]he discretionary
nature of the doctrine, combined with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its
199

Note that in some cases the judge may omit analysis of the alternative forum because the plaintiff does not
challenge its availability and adequacy.
200
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 516.
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application, make uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible.”201 And if there
is one thing that scholars of forum non conveniens agree about, it is that the doctrine produces
unpredictable results.202
In principle, however, forum non conveniens decisionmaking is not unpredictable. As
Table 4 above indicates, when the political and legal factors suggested by the seven hypotheses
discussed above are taken together, they are able to correctly classify more than 70 percent of
published U.S. district court forum non conveniens decisions. The “adjusted count R-squared”
statistic indicates that these factors correctly predict these decisions 43.5 percent more accurately
than simply predicting that the motion will be denied, which is the most frequently observed
outcome.203 Even the territorial heuristic by itself—whether the transnational activity giving rise
to the litigation occurred all or mostly outside U.S. territory—is able to predict 70 percent of the
decisions, which is not bad for a rule of thumb. One would be hard-pressed to find many
examples of legal decisionmaking that can be predicted with much more accuracy than this given
the limited determinacy of legal texts and the disincentive to sue that becomes increasingly
strong as legal outcomes become increasingly certain.204
But the rule of law demands more than this. The factors influencing judicial
decisionmaking, including forum non conveniens decisionmaking, should be discernable in
doctrine, not only in the results of statistical analysis. Yet the doctrine does not suggest that the
foreign state’s status as a liberal democracy is a relevant factor, and while several factors that are
doctrinally relevant may in some cases be correlated with the location of the transnational
activity giving rise to litigation, the doctrine does not explicitly identify territoriality as a relevant
factor. This is a problem for at least two reasons. First, inclusion in legal doctrine of the actual
factors influencing court decisions is a functional requirement for realizing the value of
predictability, since transnational actors and their attorneys obviously are far more likely to have
knowledge of U.S. legal doctrine than patterns and determinants of U.S. district court
decisionmaking such as those considered in this paper—even if Holmes’ “bad man” would like
to find an attorney with sound knowledge of the latter.205 Second, the rule-of-law value of
impartiality insists on not simply equal treatment by agents of the state, but equal treatment in
accordance with recognized legal rules, the status of which is enjoyed by legislation and
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Supreme Court precedents, but not naked decisionmaking outcomes.206 For these reasons,
although my statistical analysis suggests that forum non conveniens decisions are, taken together,
neither arbitrary nor indistinguishable, this is at best only partially good news for the ability of
domestic law and domestic courts to foster transnational rule of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Domestic courts routinely make decisions that allocate values among transnational actors,
and these decisions have broad implications for transnational activity, making transnational
judicial governance a distinct and important object of study. The goal of the governanceoriented approach to transnational law is to improve our knowledge of transnational judicial
governance, and to use that knowledge as an empirical foundation for normative analysis.
In this paper, I applied the governance-oriented approach to the allocation of adjudicative
authority by U.S. district courts under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. From a rule of law
perspective, the results are mixed. On the one hand, there is evidence, albeit inconclusive, that
dismissals may be more common than contemplated by Supreme Court precedent. Forum non
conveniens in action exhibits a strong bias against foreign plaintiffs, an outcome that might be
justified from an internal rule of law perspective since the forum non conveniens doctrine
condones it, but one that is not easily squared with the value of impartiality from an external rule
of law perspective. U.S. district courts routinely dismiss transnational litigation in favor of
foreign courts without engaging in the analysis necessary to meaningfully assess their adequacy.
And decisions do not appear to be based on the systematic application of the factors specified by
doctrine.
On the other hand, the evidence clearly indicates that U.S. district courts are willing to
defer, and in fact frequently do defer, to foreign governance authority—which is a necessary
condition for the emergence of a global community of courts on the basis of judicial comity, and
arguably a necessary condition for any well-functioning system of transnational judicial
governance. Cases rarely are dismissed in favor of foreign courts in states with below-average
rule of law ratings—a desirable outcome, even if U.S. district courts do not necessarily deserve
the credit. Political factors do not appear to be important drivers of the allocation of adjudicative
authority, with the interesting exception of the foreign state’s regime type. And because they
face a difficult combination of high decisionmaking demands and limited resources, to the extent
U.S. district courts actually use the territoriality heuristic as a decisionmaking shortcut, doing so
can be understood not as an abdication of the law, but as an effective tool for fostering
transnational rule of law to the greatest extent practicable under the circumstances that confront
them.
What do these findings about forum non conveniens in action tell us about transnational
judicial governance? One must generalize with caution. Judicial allocation of adjudicative
authority among states in forum non conveniens decisionmaking may differ from the allocation
of other values by domestic courts in other legal settings. Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis
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may offer some clues about the ability of domestic courts to foster the transnational rule of law,
which I will state as a series of four tentative propositions. First, the ability of domestic courts to
foster transnational rule of law largely depends on transnational legal doctrine. Without
relatively clear and simple legal rules to follow, there is only so much that judges can do to
enhance the kind of predictability demanded by the rule of law, namely predictability based on
recognized legal rules rather than naked judicial practice. Second, both legal and non-legal
factors influence the way that domestic courts behave as global governors, but transnational
judicial governance is not political in a partisan sense. Third, one might argue that transnational
judicial governance is, for certain realms of transnational activity, preferable to alternative forms
of governance such as international institutions or private governance. But even if it is the best
available solution—which, of course, is debatable—it also is less than ideal from a rule of law
perspective, and inevitably so under present conditions. Finally, these conditions could be
improved. Imbalances between decisionmaking demands and decisionmaking resources are not
intrinsic to domestic courts as institutions. Nor are vague and complex legal doctrines like forum
non conveniens inevitable. The constraints of judges’ bounded rationality could be mitigated
(although never eliminated) by increasing judicial resources or by simplifying legal doctrine,
thereby enhancing the ability of domestic courts to foster transnational rule of law. Further
governance-oriented analysis of transnational law may be able to shed light on the validity of
these propositions and improve our overall understanding of transnational judicial governance.
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